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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM, 
Deceased. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 89 0419 
Priority 16 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment pursuant to 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Utah 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2 (1990 Supp.) and Article VIII of the Utah Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
denying Beneficiaries a new trial?1 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it 
excluded Exhibits A, B, C and D pursuant to Rule 403 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, but admitted into evidence a written 
stipulation conceding the relevant portions of Exhibits A, B, C 
and D? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court will not reverse a trial court's evidentiary 
ruling, including those pursuant to Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
1
 Although the Beneficiaries asserted additional bases for a 
new trial, they have only appealed two: (1) the parol evidence 
rule, infra at 16-26; and (2) estoppel, infra at 26-29. 
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Evidence, unless the trial court has abused its discretion. 
State v, Larsen. 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989). fl[T]he error 
must have been harmful" to constitute an abuse of discretion. 
Larsen, 775 P.2d at 419. See also Utah R. Evid. 103. 
A trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial will 
not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Lembach v. Cox, 
639 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1981), overruled on other grounds, 728 P.2d 117 
(1986). The trial court's abuse must be "clearly shown." 
Pollesche v. Transamerican Insurance Co.. 27 Utah 2d 430, 497 
P.2d 236, 238 (1972). It must appear that "'[its] action was 
arbitrary, or that it clearly transgressed any reasonable bounds 
of discretion.'" Lembach, 639 P.2d at 201 (quoting from Hyland 
v. St. Mark's Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d 736 (1967)). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1): 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may 
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or 
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of 
the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is 
one admitting evidence, a timely objection or 
motion to strike appears of record, stating 
the specific ground of objection, if the 
specific ground was not apparent from the 
context. 
Utah R. Evid. 401: 
'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is 
of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence. 
1 0l590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray 2 
Utah R. Evid. 403: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, 
This was an action by some beneficiaries 
("Beneficiaries") of Clarence I. Justheim ("Clarence") to recover 
certain stock given by Clarence to Raymond A. Ebert ("Ray"). 
B. The Course of Proceedings. 
On June 29, 1984, St. Mark's Episcopal Cathedral Parish 
(the "Parish") filed a petition to remove Ray as personal 
representative of the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim (the 
"Estate") and as trustee of a trust created by Clarence (the 
"Removal Issue") and to recover stock in Wyoming Petroleum 
Company given to Ray by Clarence before his death (the "Gift 
Issue"). (R. 61-66). Other beneficiaries subsequently joined in 
the Parish's petition. Trial was scheduled for May 27, 1986. At 
trial, the parties agreed to try just the Removal Issue and 
reserve the Gift Issue for later resolution. (R. 1004). 
The Removal Issue was tried on various days in May, 
June and July, 1986. On August 5, 1986, the trial court entered 
a Decree denying the petitions to remove Ray. (R. 1154-58). On 
August 25, 1986, the trial court entered an Order of 
Certification that the Decree was a final order under Rule 54(b) 
/ 01590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray 3 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 1159-61). The 
Beneficiaries appealed the Decree. (R. 1171-72). On July 18, 
1989, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the Decree. (R. 2775-
78) . 
C. Disposition in the Court Below. 
The Gift Issue was tried by the Third Judicial District 
Court, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy presiding, in June, 1989. 
The jury returned a verdict in Ray's favor. (R. 2655). Judge 
Murphy, acting independently as a factfinder, also found in Ray's; 
favor. (Tr. 2905.186-88). On July 7, 1989, Judge Murphy entered 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree and Judgment on 
Verdict upholding the intervivos gifts to Ray. (R. 2677-81). 
The Beneficiaries filed a Motion for New Trial which Judge Murphy 
denied. (R. 2718-24, 55). This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Originally, Clarence owned 127,743 shares in Wyoming 
Petroleum Company ("Wyoco") which represented 50% control. (Tr. 
2907.80-82, 87-94; Tr. Exs. 3, 15). Subsequently, Clarence 
bought another 23,400 shares of Wyoco stock which represented 
majority control. (Tr. 2907.89-93; Tr. Ex. 15). Clarence gave 
all his Wyoco stock to Ray. (Tr. 2907.80-82, 93-95), 
A. The Gifts 
In May 1981, Ray visited Clarence at home. (Tr. 
2907.80, 85; Tr. Ex. 2). Clarence handed some stock to Ray and 
said "Here, Ray. I want you to have these." (Tr. 2907.81). The 
101590.mb.jr.aplbnef.ray 4 
stock represented 120,431 shares in Wyoco.2 (Tr. 2907.129; Tr. 
Ex. 1). Ray took the stock home where he kept it until after 
Clarence's death. (Tr. 2907.84-85). 
In Spring 1982, Clarence bought another 23,400 shares 
of Wyoco stock. (Tr. 2907.89-93). In May 1982, while Ray was 
visiting, Clarence handed some more stock to Ray and said "Here, 
this is all my stock in Wyoming Petroleum, and I want you to have 
it." (Tr. 2907.93-94). The stock represented 30,712 shares.3 
(Tr. Ex. 3). Ray took the stock home and kept it with the other 
stock until after Clarence's death. (Tr. 2907.94-95). 
B. Clarence's Regard For Ray 
Ray and Clarence met in 1945 as co-employees of the 
United States Postal Service. (Tr. 2907.57-58). In 
approximately 1948, Clarence resigned from the postal service to 
conduct his own business interests. (Tr. 2907.58). From about 
1947 until his death, Ray participated in several of Clarence's 
business ventures. (Tr. 2907.59-62). Beginning in 1953, Ray 
purchased shares on the public market in Justheim Petroleum 
Company ("Justco"), another of Clarence's business interests. 
(Tr. 2907.61). Ray ultimately owned or controlled 180,000 shares 
in Justco. (Tr. 2907.61-62). 
2
 Clarence kept one certificate which represented 7,312 
shares. (Tr. Ex. 3). 
3
 The second gift included the newly acquired 23,400 shares 
plus the 7,312 shares originally possessed by Clarence but kept 
by him when he made the first gift of 12 0,431 shares. 
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Prior to retiring, Clarence had asked Ray to work for 
him on three or four occasions, but Ray had declined. 
(Tr. 2907.61). In 1971, Ray retired from the postal service. 
(Tr. 2907.59). In 1973, Clarence asked and Ray agreed to serve 
as a director of Justco. (Tr. 2907.62). 
In 1978, Clarence asked Frank Allen ("Allen"), his 
attorney, to prepare an estate plan. (Tr. 2908.76, 78-79). Ray 
still owned stock in Justco, and was still a director. 
(Tr. 2907.61-62). Clarence asked Ray to be his personal 
representative and trustee. (Tr. 2907.62). On June 22, 1978, 
Clarence executed his Will designating Ray personal 
representative4 and an inter vivos trust appointing Ray trustee.5 
(Tr. Exs. 8, 9). 
Clarence amended his inter vivos trust on five 
occasions: March 22, 1979, June 7, 1979, January 17, 1980, 
January 21, 1980, and January 1981. (Tr. Exs. 10-14). None of 
the amendments changed Clarence's original appointment of Ray. 
The January 1981 amendment added Ray as a .005 percent residuary 
beneficiary. (Tr. Ex. 14). Clarence orally reaffirmed his 
confidence in Ray when he discussed the amendments with Allen. 
(Tr. 2904.11). 
4
 The Will also designated Allen to act as the Estate's 
attorney. (Tr. Ex. 8). 
5
 Clarence's wife, Margaret, also executed a will and inter 
vivos trust designating and appointing Ray her personal 
representative and trustee. (R. 1649-50). 
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In November 1978, Clarence was seriously injured in an 
automobile accident. (Tr. 2907.64). For two or three weeks after 
the accident, Clarence was incoherent. (Tr. 2907.64-65). During 
that time, Ray frequently visited or checked on Clarence. 
(Tr. 2907.64). After Clarence became coherent, he told Ray l!I 
am going to need some help." (Tr. 2907.68). Ray said he would 
help. 
Clarence remained in the hospital until February 1979. 
During that time, Ray visited Clarence three to five times a 
week. Among other things, Ray picked up Clarence's mail, 
delivered the mail and other items to Clarence at the hospital 
and returned materials and Clarence's instructions to the office. 
(Tr. 2907.69). 
After Clarence was released and until his death, he was 
substantially confined to his home. (Tr. 2907.70-74, 2906.148). 
For some five years, Ray spent six days a week, twenty minutes to 
five hours a day helping Clarence and Chickie. (Tr. 2907.70). 
Ray visited Clarence, typed his personal correspondence, 
delivered his personal and corporate mail for him, assisted him 
in his personal affairs, shopped for him, help him care for his 
invalid wife, and generally provided him the kind of comfort and 
companionship a confined person craves. (Tr. 2907.70-74). Ray 
did whatever Clarence wanted. Ray acted purely out of friendship 
and affection and was not motivated by expectation of 
compensation. (Tr. 2907.75). In fact, Ray never asked to be 
/ 01590.mb.jr.aplbnef.ray 1 
compensated.6 Clarence's relationship with Mrs. Ebert was also a 
source of comfort for him in his last years; Clarence called her 
almost nightly, and they ended their conversations with common 
prayer. (Tr. 2906.130-32). 
C. Corroboration For The Gifts. 
In 1979, Clarence asked Allen to amend his trust. 
(Tr. 2908.83-85). Clarence wanted to include the Parish and its 
Dean as beneficiaries. (Tr. 2908.85). Although Allem had not 
yet met Ray, Clarence had often expressed to Allen affection for 
Ray. (Tr. 2904.26-27, 29-31). Allen asked Clarence, "If you're 
going to take care of people other than your family, what about 
Ray Ebert?" (Tr. 2904.30, 2908.84). Clarence replied "I'm 
taking care of Ray." (Tr. 2904.31). 
In early 1981, Clarence told Allen he wanted to give 
Ray (whom Allen still had not met) Wyoco stock. (Tr. 2908.90-
93). Clarence asked if he could make the gift without 
transferring the stock on Wyoco's books. (Tr. 2908.90-91). 
Allen said formal transfer was not necessary, and that a gift 
could be made by delivering endorsed certificates with a 
declaration of present donative intent. (Tr. 2908.91). 
Ray told his wife, Grace, about the first and second 
gifts immediately after each had been made. After receiving the 
first gift, Ray went home. (Tr. 2907.84). As Ray entered his 
home, he "waved" the stock at Grace. (Id.; Tr. 2907.136). Ray 
6
 Clarence periodically reimbursed Ray for small out of 
pocket expenses. (Tr. 2907.75). 
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said to Grace "Mr. Clarence Justheim has given me over $100,000 -
- I mean 100,000 shares of Wyoming Petroleum." (Tr. 2906.136). 
After receiving the second gift, Ray took the stock home. 
(Tr. 2907.94-95; 2906.137-39). The stock was contained in a 
brown envelope. (Tr. 2907.94-95). When Ray arrived home, Grace 
noticed a "big brown envelope" in his hands. (Tr. 2906.139). 
Ray told Grace "Clarence had gotten the stock that he [Ebert] had 
gotten, and that was all the stock in Wyoming Petroleum that he 
owned, and gave it to Ray as a gift." 
On May 28, 1981, Clarence asked Ray to type up a 
document from several handwritten notes. (Tr. 2907.85-86). Ray 
typed the document and took it to Clarence the following day. 
(Tr. 2907.86). On May 29, 1981, Clarence signed the document in 
Ray's presence. That document is the Codicil to Clarence's Will. 
(Tr. Ex. 2). The Codicil states in pertinent part: 
I hereby give, bequeath, and devise to Raymond A. 
Ebert, to be his absolutely, without accountability in 
the distribution provided for in the residuary of my 
said will, all of my interest and stock holdings in the 
Wyoming Petroleum Corp., if he is living . . . . 
(Tr. Ex. 2). Although the Codicil was not properly witnessed for 
probate purposes,7 it is direct evidence of Clarence's desire 
that Ray receive the Wyoco stock. 
7
 The Beneficiaries claim that the Application For Informal 
Probate of Will and Informal Appointment of Personal 
Representative filed with the trial court did not disclose the 
Codicil's invalid testamentary effect. (Appellants' Brief, at 
5). Not so. The Application referred to the Will and the 
Codicil. The Application represented that the Will was validly 
executed, but made no such representation about the Codicil. 
(Tr. Ex. 17, ff 8-9). Furthermore, a copy of the Codicil was 
attached which clearly disclosed the lack of requisite witnesses. 
Ebert never asserted the Codicil was valid as a testamentary 
instrument. 
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D. Clarence's Relationship With John Morgan Jr. 
During his life, Clarence associated professionally 
with John H. Morgan, Sr. ("Morgan Sr."). (Tr. 2907.83, 2906.143-
44). For more than thirty years, they and their businesses 
shared offices, used the same secretarial staff and often did 
business together. (Tr. 2907.83, 2906.144-45). In 1953, Morgan 
Sr. and Clarence agreed to share and maintain equal control of 
Wyoco. (Tr. 2907.89-90, 2906.150). In 1950, John H. Morgan, Jr. 
("Morgan, Jr.") became associated professionally with Morgan Sr. 
and Clarence. (Tr. 2906.145). 
By at least 1978, Clarence's relationship with the 
Morgans had begun to deteriorate. In 1978, when Clarence asked 
Allen to prepare an estate plan, he expressed resentment toward 
Morgan Jr. interfering in his affairs. (Tr. 2908.94-95). 
Clarence told Allen that Morgan Jr. had been urging him to 
establish an estate plan because of the effect his death would 
have on Morgan Jr.'s business. On several occasions, Clarence 
expressed to Allen his resentment toward, fear of and his 
inability to resist Morgan Jr. (Tr. 2908.93-95, 98-99, 2904.3-
10) . 
In 1980, Clarence told Allen that Morgan Jr. had 
demanded that Clarence make Morgan Jr. a co-trustee under his 
Trust. (Tr. 2908.96, 98-99). Clarence asked Allen to prepare an 
amendment appointing Morgan Jr. co-trustee to avoid additional 
harassment, but also asked Allen to prepare an amendment which 
would revoke that appointment. (Tr. 2908.99-105). Clarence 
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asked Ray to type the amendment revoking Morgan Jr.'s appointment 
from a handwritten draft prepared by Allen (Tr. Ex. 27). 
(Tr. 2906.68-73). Clarence refused to sign the amendment 
appointing Morgan Jr. (Tr. Ex. 12) until another had been 
prepared revoking the appointment (Tr. Ex. 13). 
(Tr. 2907.145-46, 2908.104-05). Clarence executed the amendment 
appointing Morgan Jr. on January 17, 1980. (Tr. Ex. 12). On 
January 21, 1980, Clarence executed the amendment revoking Morgan 
Jr.'s appointment. (Tr. Ex. 13). 
In 1981, when Clarence asked Allen about giving Wyoco 
stock to Ray, Clarence said he did not want to transfer the gift 
on Wyoco's books. (Tr. 2908.90-91). Clarence was concerned that 
Morgan Jr. would discover the gift, if transferred, because 
Morgan Jr. had access to Wyoco's books. (Tr. 2907.82-83). 
Clarence wanted to avoid further harassment from Morgan Jr. (Tr. 
2904.7). At the time of the first gift, Clarence asked Ray to 
not disclose the gift to the Morgans. (Tr. 2907.119). Ray 
understood he was not to transfer the stock until after 
Clarence's death. (Tr. 2907.82-83, 119). 
In February 1982, Morgan Sr. died. (Tr. 2907.83). 
Subsequently, Clarence set out to buy additional Wyoco stock to 
gain control of Wyoco and to keep control away from Morgan Jr. 
(Tr. 2907.89-93, 95, 2904.5-10). Shortly after Morgan Sr.'s 
death, Clarence bought 2 3,4 00 additional shares of Wyoco stock. 
(Tr. 2907.90-93). At the time of the second gift, Clarence told 
Ray again "Be damn sure you don't let Bud [Morgan Jr.] know 
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nothing about them." (Tr. 2906.5). Clarence further remarked 
that he "wanted to show these Morgans he wasn't — he wasn't as 
dumb as they thought he was." (Tr. 2907.95). Clarence repeated 
his request that Ray not transfer the stock until after his 
death. (Tr. 2907.119, 2906.63-66). 
E. Clarence's Family 
Clarence died on July 3, 1983. (Tr. 2907.77). 
Clarence's wife was an invalid. (Tr. 2906.130, 2901,12, 78-80). 
Clarence had no children. (Tr. 2906.130). Clarence had no close 
relatives. (Tr. 2907.75-77, 2904.34-35). 
F. Ray's Disclosure to Allen 
Approximately a week after Clarence's death, Ray 
delivered Clarence's Will, Codicil, Trust and its amendments to 
Allen. (Tr. 2907.101). Prior to July 22, 1983, Ray met with 
Allen and discussed the Codicil and both gifts. (Tr. 2907.102-
04, 106-08, 2904.13-19). Allen advised Ray the Codicil had no 
testamentary effect because it lacked the requisite witnesses. 
(Tr. 2904.18). Allen explained, however, that the Codicil was 
written evidence of Clarence's intent to give Ray the stock. 
(Tr. 2907.114). After thoroughly questioning Ray about the 
gifts, Allen was convinced Ray was telling the truth. 
(Tr. 2904.21). Based on that, Allen advised Ray that the stock 
would not be included as property of the Estate initially and the 
issue would be submitted to the probate court for final 
determination. (Tr. 2904.22-23). 
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G. John Morgan Jr.'s Animosity Toward Rav 
Immediately after Clarence's funeral, Ray informed 
Morgan Jr. that Clarence had revoked Morgan Jr.'s appointment as 
co-trustee. (Tr. 2907.227). Morgan Jr. became visibly angry and 
demanded proof. (id.; Tr. 2906.99-100). Ray referred Morgan Jr. 
to Allen. That incident sparked Morgan Jr.'s hostility toward 
Ray. (Tr. Ex. 19). 
Morgan Jr. believed he was entitled to succeed to his 
father's agreement with Clarence to share and maintain equal 
control of Wyoco. (Tr. 2906.173-74). After Clarence acquired 
majority control of Wyoco, Morgan Jr. pestered Clarence to sell 
him 50% of the control stock. (Tr. 2906.113). Clarence refused. 
(Tr. 2906.174). Shortly after Clarence's death, Ray told Morgan 
Jr. he owned the Wyoco stock. (Tr. 2906.98-101). Thereafter, 
Morgan Jr. requested that Ray sell him 50% of the control stock. 
(Tr. 2906.174). Ray also refused. (Tr. 2906.175). 
Prior to his death, Justheim, Justco and Wyoco had made 
substantial investments in certain projects sponsored by Morgan 
Jr. (Tr. 2906.168-69). After Clarence's death, Morgan Jr. 
besieged Ray to get Justco, Wyoco and the Estate to continue 
their investments. (Tr. 2906.171-73). Justco, Wyoco and the 
Estate stopped making investments. (Tr. 2906.173). 
Morgan Jr. blamed Ray for the revocation of his 
appointment as co-trustee, Clarence's acquisition of the control 
stock, his subsequent refusal to sell Morgan Jr. 50% of that 
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stock and the discontinuance of investments in Morgan Jr.'s 
projects. (Tr. 2906.173, 176-84). Morgan Jr. was bothered by 
Ray's control of Wyoco. (Tr. 2906.180-84, 191). Morgan Jr. was 
so bothered, he ultimately sued Ray in four separate actions 
relating to Ray's control of Wyoco. (Tr. 2906.176-84). In fact, 
this action was originated with and financed by Morgan Jr. in an 
attempt to oust Ray and gain control of Wyoco. (Tr. 2906.180-
84) . 
In the heat of those emotions, Morgan Jr. wrote Ray on 
October 10, 1983, November 21, 1983, December 4, 1983 and January 
21, 1984.8 (Tr. Exs. A, B, C and D). Among other irrelevant 
things, Morgan Jr. initially inquired about and later challenged 
Ray's claim to the Wyoco stock through the Codicil. Ray never 
responded to Morgan Jr. (Tr. 2906.152, 154). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Beneficiaries have waived their parol evidence rule 
and estoppel objections. The Beneficiaries first complained 
after a verdict and judgment had been rendered. The 
Beneficiaries have never specified the evidence which should have 
been excluded. They are too late. Co-Vest Corp. v. Corbett, 73 5 
P.2d 1308 (Utah 1987); Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc. v. 
Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859 (Utah 1983); Peterson v. Hansen-
Niederhauser, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 355, 374 P.2d 513 (1962). 
Exhibit D is incorrectly dated January 21, 1983. All 
parties stipulated that the correct date was January 21, 1984. 
(Tr. 2898.31-32). 
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The parol evidence rule violation relates to the 
Codicil which Ray offered as collateral evidence to the ultimate 
issue of whether or not the gifts were valid. The parol evidence 
contradicted a factual recital in the Codicil, not its terms. No 
evidence of integration was offered. Therefore, the parol 
evidence rule was inapplicable. Weaver v. Modula, 557 P.2d 152 
(Utah 1976); Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985); 
Fullmer v. Morrill, 2 Utah 2d 347, 273 P.2d 885 (1954). 
The Beneficiaries did not offer any evidence at trial 
and do not assert on appeal that: (1) Ray made a false 
representation to or concealed any material facts from them; (2) 
they were without knowledge or the means of knowledge of the true 
facts; (3) Ray intended to induce them to detrimentally change 
their position; and (4) they relied on Ray's conduct or silence 
to their detriment. Absent that evidence, estoppel is 
inapplicable. Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) . 
The Beneficiaries have failed to demonstrate that the 
trial court abused its discretion in excluding Exhibits A, B, C 
and D pursuant to Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The 
exhibits were irrelevant. The exhibits did not support the 
theory for which they were offered. The testimony of Morgan Jr., 
the exhibits1 author, contradicted the exhibits1 content. The 
trial court considered the entire exhibits and their substance 
was considered by the jury. The exhibits were cumulative and 
accused Ray of speculative and collateral misconduct. The danger 
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of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the exhibits1 
probative value. Utah R. Evid. 403. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING BENEFICIARIES A NEW TRIAL BASED ON THE ALLEGED 
IMPROPER ADMISSION OF PAROL EVIDENCE. 
The Beneficiaries assert the trial court improperly 
admitted certain parol evidence, entitling them to a new trial. 
To reverse, this Court must determine that the trial court 
transgressed all reasonable bounds of discretion in finding that 
the parol evidence rule was inapplicable and therefore, denied 
Beneficiaries a new trial. Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197, 201 
(Utah 1981), overruled on other grounds, 728 P. 2d 117 (1986); Lee v. 
Howes, 548 P.2d 619, 621 (Utah 1976). 
A. The Beneficiaries Have Waived Any Alleged Error. 
The Beneficiaries did not raise the issue of parol 
evidence in the pretrial order. (R. 2490-2525). The 
Beneficiaries made no pretrial motion to exclude any parol 
evidence. The Beneficiaries concede their failure to object to 
the admission of any parol evidence during trial. (Appellants1 
Brief, at 15). The Beneficiaries did not move to strike the 
parol evidence during trial. The Beneficiaries first raised the 
issue after the trial court had rendered its decision and the 
jury had rendered its verdict.9 The Beneficiaries have never 
9
 The Beneficiaries imply that they have preserved their 
objection by raising it in their post-trial motions. 
(Appellants' Brief, at 15). The Beneficiaries have not cited any 
law. In Utah, a motion to strike improper evidence made after a 
verdict has been rendered is untimely. See Peterson v. Hansen-
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specified the evidence which they claim should have been 
excluded. 
The Beneficiaries argue their failure to object during 
trial should not preclude this Court from addressing the parol 
evidence issue. (Appellants1 Brief, at 15-17). The 
Beneficiaries suggest there is a "modern trend" to address the 
parol evidence rule on appeal despite a party's failure to object 
at trial. (Id. at 16-17). The Beneficiaries rely on an 
annotation at 81 A.L.R. 3d 249. (£d. at 16). That annotation 
does not show a trend, past or modern. The annotation was 
published thirteen years ago. The original annotation cites 
twenty-three states and one federal jurisdiction allegedly 
supporting the Beneficiaries' position. The cases from those 
jurisdictions range in dates from 1944 to 1975. 81 A.L.R. 3d, at 
257-59, 264-66. The original annotation also cites twenty-two 
states which preclude the parol evidence issue on appeal. Id. at 
254, 256, 260-62. At most, the original annotation shows a split 
across the country. 
The updated annotation shows a greater trend to 
preclude the parol evidence rule on appeal absent an objection 
Niederhauser. Inc.. 13 Utah 2d 355, 374 P.2d 513, 515 (1962). 
"Expansion on non-specific objections in a motion for a new trial 
or in a brief on appeal . . . does not cure the lack of 
timeliness in making proper objections to the trial court." 
Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859, 
861 (Utah 1983)(emphasis added). If a motion for a new trial 
cannot cure an untimely non-specific objection, an entirely new 
objection raised on a motion for new trial can not preserve the 
issue for appeal. 
101590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray 17 
during trial. 81 A.L.R. 3d 249 (Supp. 1990). The 1990 
Supplement lists twelve jurisdictions precluding the issue on 
appeal and eight jurisdictions allowing the issue. Two of the 
jurisdictions precluding the issue (Oklahoma and Michigan) were 
listed by the original annotation as jurisdictions which did not 
preclude the issue on appeal. 
More significant is that neither the annotation nor the 
Beneficiaries have referred to Utah's position. Rule 103 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence states: 
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one 
admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion 
to strike appears of record, stating the specific 
ground of objection, if the specific ground was 
not apparent from the context . . . . 
(emphasis added). The objection must be made prior to or during 
trial and the grounds for the objection must be "clear and 
specific." State v. Schreuder. 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986). 
See also State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1982); 
Stagmever v. Latham Bros.. Inc., 20 Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279, 
282 (1968). 
Rule 103 applies to the admission of parol evidence. 
In Co-Vest Corp. v. Corbett, 735 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1987), this 
Court held that the appellants had waived any claim that 
extrinsic evidence should have been excluded by their failure to 
object at the trial level. Id. at 1309. The only issue at trial 
I01590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray 18 
was the construction of a written instrument. Both sides offered 
parol evidence. Neither party objected. The trial court 
rendered its decision. Appellants first raised the issue on 
appeal. This Court wrote: "Because defendants did not object to 
the extrinsic evidence at the trial level, they cannot claim on 
appeal that the document is clear and unambiguous and is not 
subject to interpretationn [sic] with extrinsic evidence." 
The Beneficiaries argue judicial economy will be served 
by adopting a rule that parol evidence need not be objected to at 
trial.10 (Appellants1 Brief, at 17). To the contrary, such a 
rule would destroy judicial economy and cause considerable waste 
to the courts and litigants. If the Beneficiaries1 position were 
adopted, Rule 103 ignored and Co-Vest overruled, an element of 
"risk and advantage" would exist. See Petersen v. Hansen -
Niederhauser. Inc.. 13 Utah 2d 355, 374 P.2d 513, 515 (1962). A 
party could remain silent as inadmissible evidence is admitted. 
If the evidence is favorable, the party could permit it to stand 
and argue it to the factfinder. Id. After losing, the party 
could appeal and be guaranteed a reversal and new trial. Id. 
The opposing party would be subjected to the cost and delay of 
the appeal and new trial, all of which could be avoided by a 
timely objection. 
10
 The Beneficiaries cite Furniture Manufacturers Sales, 
Inc. v. Deamer, 680 P.2d 398 (Utah 1984) as an illustration of 
how judicial economy will be served. (Appellants1 Brief, at 17). 
To the contrary, Deamer does not address judicial economy at all. 
Deamer does illustrate, however, that if a party does not object 
at trial, any error is waived. Id. at 400. 
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This case is a perfect example. The Beneficiaries 
remained silent as the alleged inadmissible evidence was 
received. (Appellants1 Brief, at 15). On cross-examination, the 
Beneficiaries elicited from Ray testimony of the alleged 
inconsistency between the first gift and the factual recital of 
Clarence's stock ownership in the Codicil. (Tr. 2907.149-50, 
165-67). In opening and closing, the Beneficiaries argued the 
Codicil conclusively established that the first gift was 
inconsistent and false. (Tr. 2907.33-34, 2905.146). Having 
taken the risk and lost, the Beneficiaries now want the advantage 
of a new trial. The Beneficiaries1 position creates judicial 
instability and judges would become advocates. To preserve the 
reliability of verdicts and judgments, judges would have to take 
the initiative to object, or remind counsel to object and exclude 
the evidence. That burden is too onerous. The need for timely 
objections is as vital for violations of the parol evidence rule 
as any other evidence. The Beneficiaries should not be allowed 
to do nothing to exclude the alleged inadmissible evidence, 
elicit testimony and offer evidence of the alleged inconsistency, 
argue the alleged inconsistency to the jury and trial judge and 
after losing the case argue that the evidence should have been 
excluded. 
B. The Parol Evidence Rule is Inapplicable. 
The Beneficiaries1 attempt to apply the parol evidence 
rule is misplaced. The parol evidence rule is a "principle of 
contract interpretation . . . [with] a very narrow application." 
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Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985). The parol 
evidence rule applies when the basis of the action is the 
construction and enforcement of a written document. Edmonds v. 
Galey, 458 P.2d 650, 652 (Wyo. 1969). In that case, parol 
evidence is not admissible to contradict or vary the clear and 
unambiguous terms of the written document. Union Bank v. 
Swenson. 707 P.2d at 665. 
The Beneficiaries assert the trial court improperly 
admitted parol evidence which varied or contradicted the 
Codicil. The action, however, was not brought to construe and 
enforce the terms of the Codicil. It is undisputed that the 
Codicil lacked the requisite witnesses to create an effective 
testamentary device. The sole purpose of this action was to 
determine the validity of two gifts.11 Ray offered the Codicil 
merely as collateral evidence of his relationship with Clarence 
and Clarence's intent that Ray ultimately receive the Wyoco 
stock. 
The parol evidence rule is inapplicable where the 
alleged violation of the rule relates to a document which is 
offered as collateral evidence to the ultimate issue. Weaver v. 
Modula, 557 P.2d 152, 153 (Utah 1976). In Weaver, a real estate 
agent sued to recover commissions from the prospective sellers. 
11
 The Beneficiaries argue that both gifts should be 
invalidated. (Appellants1 Brief, at 7-8, 21). However, neither 
the parol evidence rule nor the estoppel theory affect the second 
gift. Clarence's factual recital in the Codicil is only 
inconsistent with the first gift. 
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Id, at 152-53. The agent sought to have his agreement with the 
sellers construed and enforced. The written agency agreement 
stated that the sellers would pay the agent a commission if he 
found "'a party who is ready, able and willing to buy . . . . 'l! 
Id. at 153. Parol evidence regarding various agreements between 
the sellers and a prospective buyer was received. The trial 
court found that the agent had not found an "able" buyer and, 
therefore, was not entitled to recover his commissions. 
On appeal, the agent asserted the trial court 
improperly admitted parol evidence. This Court held that the 
violation of the parol evidence rule related to the terms of the 
contracts between the sellers and the buyer, not the agency 
contract between the agent and the sellers. The agency contract 
was the basis of the lawsuit and therefore, the parol evidence 
rule was inapplicable. See also Edmonds v. Galey. 458 P.2d 650 
(Wyo. 1969) (The Wyoming Supreme Court held that parol evidence 
was admissible to construe a deed which was offered cis collateral 
evidence to the ultimate issue. It did not vary the terms of the 
agreement between the plaintiffs and defendants. Id. at 651-52); 
Lee v. Kimura, 634 P.2d 1043 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981)(The Hawaii 
Court of Appeals held that parol evidence was admissible to 
construe a lease which was offered as collateral evidence of the 
agreement between the parties, as co-lessees. Id. at 1045-46); 
Doelle v. Ireco Chemicals. 391 F.2d 6, 9 (10th Cir. 1968). 
The Wyoming Supreme Court stated the rule as follows: 
[T]he parol evidence rule, like most things, has its 
exceptions. It does not apply where the writing is 
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collateral to the issue involved, and the action is not 
based on such writing. To state it another way, the 
parol evidence rule applies only where the enforcement 
of an obligation created by the writing is 
substantially the cause of action. . . . 
Edmonds, 458 P.2d at 652. Here, Ray did not seek to enforce the 
Codicil. Ray offered the Codicil as collateral evidence of 
Clarence's intent to make the gifts. The parol evidence rule was 
inapplicable. 
C. The Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Apply to Factual Recitals. 
The Codicil in its entirety states: 
I, Clarence I. Justheim, being of sound and 
disposing mind and memory and free from all menace, 
fraud, duress, undue influence or restraint whatsoever, 
do hereby make this Codicil to my Last Will and 
Testament which was signed by me, June 22, 1978. 
Prior Disposition I hereby revoke all prior 
bequests and testamentary dispositions made by me 
concerning my interest and stockholdings in the Wyoming 
Petroleum Corp., of which I own approximately Fifty 
percent (50%). 
I hereby give, bequeath, and devise to Raymond A. 
Ray, to be his absolutely, without accountability in 
the distribution provided for in the residuary of my 
said Will, all of my interest and stockholdings in the 
Wyoming Petroleum Corp., if he is living, otherwise to 
his children, if any are living, children of deceased 
children to take by right of representation. 
I have hereunder set my hand, this 29th day of 
May, 1981. 
GRANTOR: 
Clarence I. Justheim 
(Tr. Ex. 2). The phrase which the Beneficiaries contend has been 
varied by the admission of certain unidentified parol evidence 
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is: "of which I own approximately Fifty percent (50%)." 
Clarence's declaration of his ownership percentage is a factual 
recital. 
The parol evidence rule does not exclude evidence which 
contradicts or varies factual recitals. In Fullmer v. Morrill, 2 
Utah 2d 347, 273 P.2d 885 (1954), the plaintiffs agreed to sell 
to defendants 76 head of cattle, among other things. 
Subsequently, the parties executed an "Agreement" expressing the 
defendants1 promise to return the 76 head of cattle "together 
with all increase of cattle, consisting in all, 88 (eighty-eight) 
. . . ." Id. at 885-86. 
A dispute arose over four cattle. Jd. at 886. At 
trial, plaintiffs unsuccessfully contended that the four cattle 
were included in the "88" recited in the "Agreement." On appeal, 
the plaintiffs argued the "Agreement" required defendants to 
return 88 head of cattle and defendants could not vary that 
obligation by the admission of parol evidence. Id. at 887. This 
Court held that the defendants had promised to return the 
original 76 head of cattle and "all the increase." This Court 
further held that the words "'consisting in all, 88 (eighty-
eight) head1" was not part of the promise, but merely a recital 
of fact. This Court then held that "parol evidence is admissible 
to contradict a false recital of fact, the parol evidence rule 
applying only to the terms of the Contract." See also Garrett v. 
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Ellison. 72 P.2d 449 (Utah 1937)12 (This Court held that the 
parol evidence rule prohibits the admission of parol evidence to 
vary "terms" of a contract, but not factual recitals. Id. at 
451-53). 
Although the Codicil had no testamentary effect, one of 
its clear and unambiguous "terms" was that Ray receive all 
Clarence's Wyoco stock. The Beneficiaries do not claim evidence 
varying that term was improperly admitted.13 The Beneficiaries1 
only claim is that evidence contradicting Clarence's factual 
recital was improperly admitted. The parol evidence rule does 
not prohibit extrinsic evidence which varies factual recitals. 
D. The Beneficiaries Offered No Evidence of Integration. 
The parol evidence rule is only applicable where the 
parties intended that the written document constitute the sole 
and entire agreement between the parties. Union Bank v. Swenson, 
12
 The Beneficiaries rely on Garrett for the general 
proposition that Utah considers the parol evidence rule a 
substantive rule rather than a rule of evidence. (Appellants1 
Brief, at 14). The Beneficiaries recognize that this Court did 
not apply the parol evidence rule in Garrett. (Id. at 15). The 
Beneficiaries, however, fail to explain why. Although Garrett is 
cited here for the proposition that the parol evidence rule does 
not apply to factual recitals, it is another excellent example 
that parol evidence may be admitted to vary an instrument which 
is collateral to the primary issue. 
13
 The gift is not inconsistent with the Codicil's term that 
Ray receive all the Wyoco stock. The gift fulfills that term. 
The gift is only inconsistent with Clarence's factual recital. 
That inconsistency may be more apparent than real. For instance, 
Clarence might have made the Codicil as a precaution against the 
possibility, in his mind, that the first gift might be invalid 
because the stock was not transferred into Ray's name during 
Clarence's life. 
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707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985). There is no expression of 
integration in the Codicil. (Tr. Ex. 2). The Beneficiaries 
offered no evidence of integration. Thus, the parol evidence 
rule is not applicable. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT DENIED BENEFICIARIES A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE 
ESTOPPEL WAS INAPPLICABLE 
The Beneficiaries assert Ray should have been estopped 
from claiming any gifts. The Beneficiaries assert the trial 
court erred in finding that estoppel was inapplicable and 
therefore, they are entitled to a new trial. To reverse, this 
Court must determine that the trial court transgressed all 
reasonable bounds of discretion in denying Beneficiaries a new 
trial. 
A. The Beneficiaries Have Waived Any Alleged Error. 
Estoppel must be pleaded or it is waived. See Manger 
v. Davis, 619 P.2d 687, 692 (Utah 1980). The Beneficiaries did 
not plead estoppel in their petition. (R. 61-66). The 
Beneficiaries did not assert estoppel in the pretrial order. (R. 
2490-2525). Prior to trial, the Beneficiaries did not move to 
exclude any evidence based on an estoppel theory. The 
Beneficiaries did not object to the admission of or move to 
strike any evidence during trial pursuant to their estoppel 
theory. The Beneficiaries did not move for a directed verdict 
based on their estoppel theory. The Beneficiaries first raised 
the estoppel theory in their "Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
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the Verdict and Oral Judgment of the Court"14 after the jury had 
rendered its verdict and the trial court had rendered its 
decision. The Beneficiaries are too late. 
B. Estoppel Was Precluded By the Pretrial Order and Pretrial 
Motions. 
The parties1 Supplemental Pretrial Order excluded 
certain issues. (Id.) At most, Beneficiaries could argue that 
the estoppel theory is included in the issues precluded by the 
Supplemental Pretrial Order. The Beneficiaries agreed to the 
exclude those issues. In addition, the trial court granted two 
pretrial motions in limine. (R. 2526-33, 65-67, 84-88; Tr. 2898. 
4-10, 2907.4-6. Those motions were granted because the issues 
had been tried during the trial on the Removal Issue and the 
Beneficiaries had been unable to proffer any additional evidence. 
(Tr. 2898.4-10, 2907.4-6). The Beneficiaries have not appealed 
those rulings. 
C. Estoppel is Inapplicable. 
Estoppel is not favored. University of Colorado v. 
Silverman, 555 P.2d 1155, 1158 (Colo. 1976); Tribble v. Reelv, 
557 P.2d 813, 818 (Mont. 1976). The purpose of equitable 
estoppel is "'to prevent one party from deluding or inducing 
another into a position where he will unjustly suffer loss.111 
14
 Although the estoppel theory was initially asserted in 
this motion, it was incorporated by reference into the Motion for 
New Trial. The Beneficiaries have appealed the trial court's 
denial of the new trial. (Docketing Statement, dated September 
27, 1989, at 5). 
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FMA Financial Corp, v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d 327, 330 
(Utah 1980)(footnote omitted). The elements of estoppel are: 
(1) A false representation or concealment of material 
facts; (2) made with knowledge, actual or constructive, 
of the facts; (3) made to a party who is without 
knowledge or the means of knowledge of the real facts; 
(4) made with the intention that the representation be 
acted upon; and (5) the party to whom the 
representation was made relied or acted upon it to his 
prejudice. 
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 790 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). See 
also Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298, 
13 01-02 (Utah 1982). Each element must be proven or there can be 
no estoppel. Colman, 743 P.2d at 790. 
1. No Standing — The Beneficiaries do not have 
standing to assert estoppel against Ray. The Beneficiaries do 
not assert that Ray made a false representation to or concealed 
material facts from them. Evidence of any such claim was 
excluded. (R. 2565-67, 84-88; Tr. 2907.4-6). The Beneficiaries 
have not appealed that order. The Beneficiaries contend Ray 
failed to remind Clarence of the first gift when Clarence 
executed the Codicil. Thus, it is Clarence who possessed any 
claim of estoppel against Ray, not the Beneficiaries. 
2. Without Knowledge — The material facts must be 
concealed from a person "without knowledge or the means of 
knowledge of the real facts." Colman, 743 P.2d at 790. The 
Beneficiaries offered no evidence of their knowledge of the true 
facts. Clarence had knowledge of the true facts. Clarence was 
the donor. Thus, when Clarence executed the Codicil, he knew or 
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should have known that the factual recital of his ownership 
percentage was incorrect. 
3. Intent to induce is required — Any concealment of 
material fact must be intended to induce the other's detrimental 
change in position. Triple I, 652 P.2d at 1301. The 
Beneficiaries offered no evidence that Ray intended to induce 
them to change their position. In fact, the Beneficiaries have 
not asserted that Ray communicated with them in any manner 
regarding the gift. Absent some communication, Ray could not 
have induced the Beneficiaries into any type of detrimental 
conduct. Jd. at 1302. The Beneficiaries also offered no proof 
that Ray intended to induce Clarence to change his position. 
4. Must prove detrimental reliance — There was no 
detrimental reliance. The Beneficiaries offered no evidence that 
Clarence relied on Ray's silence to his prejudice. Furthermore, 
the Beneficiaries offered no evidence that they relied on Rayfs 
silence to their prejudice. The Beneficiaries have implicitly 
acknowledged the lack of any detrimental reliance. (Appellants1 
Brief, at 18-19). 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
EXCLUDING EXHIBITS A, B. C AND D 
At the beginning of trial, the Beneficiaries expressed 
their intent to call Morgan Jr. as a witness, to use in opening 
statement four letters written by Morgan Jr. to Ray, marked as 
Exhibits A, B, C and D, and to offer those letters as evidence 
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during trial. (Tr. 2898.10, 16-19). Ray moved to exclude Morgan 
Jr.'s testimony and the letters because they were irrelevant and 
unfairly prejudicial. (Tr. 2989.13, 16-17). After substantial 
discussion, the trial court refused to exclude Morgan Jr.'s 
testimony on the subject, but excluded the letters pursuant to 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. (Tr. 2989.43, 46, 48, 
52-54, 60). Exclusion of the letters was contingent on Ray's 
written stipulation admitting certain portions of the letters 
which the trial court decided were relevant.15 (Tr. 2898.43-46, 
48, 60). Over his objection, Ray entered into the written 
stipulation. (Id.; R. 2594-95) The written stipulation was to 
be admitted as evidence to the jury. (Tr. 2898.45). The 
Beneficiaries contend the letters should have been admitted in 
their entirety. 
A. Probative Value v. Dangers of Unfair Prejudice, Confusion, 
Delay and Undue Repetition. 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
By the Rule's express language, the trial judge must balance the 
probative value of the evidence against the danger of certain 
15
 The trial court excluded Exhibit C in its entirety 
because the relevant portion was cumulative. (Tr. 2898.52-53). 
Exhibit C merely repeated what was written in Exhibits A and B 
and the Beneficiaries conceded that no change of position had 
occurred between the dates of Exhibits B and C. (Id.) 
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factors which may improperly influence the jury. State v. 
Maurer. 770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989). After balancing those 
interests, if the improper factors outweigh the probative value 
of the proffered evidence, it may be excluded. 
B. The Letters Had No Probative Value. 
Rule 403 only applies to evidence "which is of 
unquestioned relevance." Id. If the proffered evidence is not 
relevant, it is not probative and cannot be admitted. "A 
precondition to exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is that it 
be otherwise relevant . . . . If it is not relevant, the 
evidence is inadmissible under FRE 402, and Rule 403 never comes 
into play." Noel Shows, Inc. v. United States, 721 F.2d 327, 329 
(11th Cir. 1983)(application of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence which is identical to Rule 4 03 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence). 
The issue at trial was whether or not Clarence had made 
valid intervivos gifts of the Wyoco stock to Ray. The elements 
of an intervivos gift are: (1) the donor's present intent to 
make the intervivos gift, and (2) the passing of possession and 
control of the property to the donee. Rule 401 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence defines "relevant evidence" as any "evidence having 
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence." The 
letters do not bear on the issues of Clarence's intent and Rayfs 
possession and control. The letters are not written by Ray or 
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Clarence. The letters do not contain any expressions attributed 
to Clarence or Ray regarding the gifts. The letters merely 
contain Morgan Jr.'s: 
1. hearsay recitation of hi interpretation of 
Clarence's past business relations ip with Morgan Sr. ; 
2. hearsay and unsupported onclusory opinions 
regarding what Clarence and Morgar Sr. intended to do 
with Wyoco; 
3. hearsay and speculative onclusory opinions 
regarding how Clarence intended tc dispose of his Wyoco 
stock; 
4. unsupported belief that :larence would not 
have given Ray the Wyoco stock by is Will and deprived 
others of that stock; 
5. speculative conclusory c inions regarding how 
Allen would have conducted himsell as a lawyer; 
6. legal conclusions regarc ng the effect of 
Clarence's Will; 
7. claim that Morgan Jr. s) >uld have equal 
control of the Wyoco stock; 
8. attempts to convince Ra: to associate 
professionally with Morgan Jr. as Jlarence did with 
Morgan Sr. in all of Clarence's cc itinuing business 
ventures, including Wyoco; 
9. discussions of various ) isiness disputes 
between Ray and Morgan Jr., but ui related to Wyoco; and 
10. hearsay and unsupported accusations of 
collateral misconduct by Ray and , len. 
None of those matters had any tendency to m; :e Clarence's present 
intent or Ray's possession and control more or less probable than 
it would have been without the evidence. 
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C. The Letters Did Not Support The Theory For Which They Were 
Proffered. 
The Beneficiaries did not offer the letters to directly 
defeat the elements of valid gifts. The Beneficiaries offered 
the letters to allegedly impeach Ray. The Beneficiaries alleged 
that Ray had changed his position. (Tr. 2898.113-14, 19-20). 
The Beneficiaries proffered that shortly after Clarence's death, 
Ray declared he had received the Wyoco stock through Clarence's 
Codicil exclusively and did not assert ownership through 
intervivos gifts. The Beneficiaries proffered that after Morgan 
Jr. discovered that the Codicil was not witnessed and challenged 
Ray's position, Ray claimed to have received the Wyoco stock 
through two intervivos gifts. The Beneficiaries offered the 
letters to show that alleged change in position. 
1. The excluded portions of the letters do not show a 
change of position — After explaining the theory for which the 
letters were allegedly offered, the trial court asked the 
Beneficiaries to specify those portions of the letters which 
supported their theory. (Tr. 2898.26-27). The Beneficiaries 
identified the following: 
In my recent discussions with you, you have indicated 
to me that Clarence, by his Will, had given you all of 
his stock of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation. You 
mentioned that this was contained in one of the 
Amendments or Codicil to Clarence's Will. I have not 
read it, but I assume what you say is the case. 
(Tr. Ex. A). 
I have a copy of Clarence's Will which Frank Allen gave 
to me. It doesn't mention Wyoming Petroleum 
Corporation stock. . . . There was never any mention 
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that he was giving all of that stock to you. Yet you 
tell me that you have an Amendment to the Will which 
gives you all of the stock. 
(Tr. Ex. B). 
As I explained in my November 21 letter to you, a copy 
of the Will that Frank gave to me never once mentions 
Wyoming Petroleum Corporation. . . . 
Yet, you have told me many times that Clarence gave all 
of that Wyoming Petroleum Corporation stock to you by 
an Amendment to the Will; and that Frank had the 
Amendment. 
(Tr. Ex. C). Exhibit C also enclosed a copy of Exhibit B. 
But we have found that the Will, or the Codicil to the 
Will, has some major defects, including the fact that 
it was not witnessed. Frank Allen has one of the best 
legal minds that I know; and no one knows better than 
Frank that it requires two witnesses for the Will to be 
legal. Therefore, I am certain that Frank did not 
prepare the Will, even though Frank was Clarence's 
lawyer. But I have to ask the question: Who did 
prepare the Will, or the Codicil to the Will? 
(Tr. Ex. D). Having identified those portions, the Beneficiaries 
tacitly admitted that the remaining portions were not relevant. 
The excluded portions do not address the gifts or the Codicil in 
any way. The excluded portions do not show a change of position. 
2. The admitted portions do not show a change of 
position — The portions identified by the Beneficiaries to 
support their theory were admitted by the stipulation, either 
verbatim or in substance. (Tr. 2906.152-54). The admitted 
portions cannot show a change of position by Ray. The letters 
were written by Morgan Jr. The admitted portions do not contain 
any admissions made by Ray. The admitted portions do not contain 
any inconsistent statements made by Ray. The admitted portions 
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do not say Ray relied exclusively on the Codicil. The letters, 
including the admitted portions, simply show Morgan Jr.'s state 
of mind, not Ray's. 
3. The evidence belied the Beneficiaries' proffered 
theory — Ray disclosed the gifts to Allen immediately after 
Clarence's death. (Tr. 2907.101-04, 106-07). Allen confirmed 
Ray's testimony. (Tr. 2904.13-25). The Beneficiaries did not 
offer any evidence to contradict that testimony. 
To prove their proffered theory, the Beneficiaries 
relied exclusively on the testimony of Morgan Jr. On direct 
examination, Morgan Jr. testified he spoke with Ray shortly 
before October 10, 1983 and that Ray claimed ownership of the 
Wyoco stock by the Codicil and did not mention a gift. (Tr. 
2906.151-52, 154). On cross-examination, Morgan Jr. finally 
admitted he spoke with Ray shortly after Clarence's death in July 
1983. (Tr. 2906.156-67). Morgan Jr. further admitted that he 
may have forgotten that Ray told him about the gifts. (Tr. 
2906.167-68). Without evidence contradicting Ray's disclosure of 
the gifts prior to Morgan Jr.'s letters, the letters cannot show 
a change in position. 
4. No duty to disclose — Even assuming Ray failed to 
mention the gifts to Morgan Jr., Ray had no duty to disclose the 
gifts to him. Morgan Jr. was not Clarence's heir. Morgan Jr. 
was not a beneficiary. Ray, not Morgan Jr., was the personal 
representative of the Estate and Trustee of the Trust. Morgan 
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Jr. did not represent any of Clarence's heirs or beneficiaries, 
Ray had no duty to disclose the gifts to Morgan Jr. 
D. The Beneficiaries Have Not Suffered Any Harm. 
1. The trial court considered the entire letters — 
Prior to trial, Ray moved to strike the Beneficiaries' demand for 
a jury. (R. 2385-89). The Beneficiaries opposed that motion. 
(R. 2408-12). The trial court denied the motion. (R. 2415). To 
avoid error, the trial court acted as an independent factfinder, 
in addition to the jury. (Tr. 2905.187). Although the letters 
were not admitted to the jury in their entirety, the trial court 
did consider them. (Tr. 2905.188). Despite the letters, the 
trial court ruled in Ray's favor. (Tr. 2905.187-88). 
2. Substance of the entire letters admitted to 
jury — Any alleged error was subsequently cured through the 
admission of other evidence. This Court has held that: "Where 
evidence is excluded by the trial court, any error which may have 
resulted from such exclusion is cured where the substance of the 
evidence is later admitted through some other means.11 State v. 
Stephens, 667 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah 1983). The substance of the 
letters in their entirety was admitted to the jury. 
The trial court compelled Ray to stipulate to the 
substance of the alleged relevant portions of the letters. (Tr. 
2898.43-46, 48, 60). The written stipulation was admitted as 
evidence to the jury. (Tr. 2906.152-54). Furthermore, Morgan 
Jr. testified and Ray was thoroughly cross-examined about the 
letters and the stipulated admissions. (Tr. 2907.83, 89-90, 
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2906.98-101, 113, 143-45, 150, 156-84). Thus, the substance of 
the excluded evidence was admitted through other means and any 
alleged error has been cured. 
3. The letters were cumulative — The Beneficiaries 
did not suffer any prejudice because the letters were cumulative. 
In Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984), this 
Court held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in 
excluding certain photos because they were cumulative. Xd. at 
548. Morgan Jr.'s letters were cumulative. The content of 
Exhibits B, C and D simply repeats the content of Exhibit A. In 
addition, the writing and receipt of the letters were admitted. 
Ray was compelled to admit the substance of the alleged relevant 
portions. The written stipulation was admitted. Ray admitted 
his failure to respond. Morgan Jr. and Ray testified regarding 
the letters, their content and Ray's failure to respond. (Tr. 
2907.83, 89-90, 2906.98-101, 113, 143-45, 150, 156-84). The 
letters could not have added anything to the Beneficiaries' case. 
E. Morgan Jr.'s Speculative Accusations of Collateral 
Misconduct Would Have Seriously Prejudiced Ray. 
The admission of the letters would have unfairly 
prejudiced Ray. 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial . . . if it has a 
tendency to influence the outcome of the trial by 
improper means, or if it appeals to the jury's 
sympathies, or arouses its sense of horror, provokes 
its instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury to 
base its decision on something other than the 
established propositions of the case. 
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Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314, 
323, n. 31 (Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, 678 P.2d 298 (1984). 
See also State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989). 
Speculative accusations and innuendoes of collateral misconduct 
have no probative value and should not be admitted. Coursen v. 
A. H. Robbins Co., Inc., 764 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1985); Moe 
v. Avions, Mareel Dassault-Brequet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 934 
(10th Cir. 1984). 
Morgan Jr.'s letters accused Ray of two acts of 
misconduct. First, Morgan Jr. accused Ray of misconduct in a 
business transaction unrelated to the gifts. Morgan Jr. had 
challenged an oil deal of Justcofs, in which Ray and others had 
personally invested while acting as directors of Justco. (Tr. 
Exs. B, C and D). Second, Morgan Jr. implied that Ray unduly 
influenced Clarence to obtain the control stock and to prepare 
the Codicil giving Ray the Wyoco stock. (Tr. Exs. B and D). All 
issues regarding undue influence had been tried with the Removal 
Issue and were excluded from the trial on the Gift Issue. (Tr. 
2898.4-9). Morgan Jr.'s speculative accusations and innuendos of 
collateral misconduct created a grave danger of prejudice and 
confusion and were properly excluded. 
CONCLUSION 
The Beneficiaries have not demonstrated that the trial 
court clearly transgressed all reasonable bounds of discretion in 
denying them a new trial. The Beneficiaries are too late to 
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assert the parol evidence rule and estoppel. Neither theory is 
applicable. Ray did not seek enforcement of the Codicil's terms 
and the evidence did not contradict those terms, only a factual 
recital. The Beneficiaries failed to offer any evidence that Ray 
concealed material facts from them to induce them to take a 
course of action which resulted in their detriment. 
The Beneficiaries have not demonstrated that the trial 
court's application of Rule 403 was clearly unreasonable. The 
letters had no probative value. The trial court admitted the 
portions which were allegedly relevant. Morgan Jr.'s testimony 
contradicted the change of position allegedly established by his 
letters. The trial court considered the entire letters and the 
substance of the letters was admitted to the jury through other 
means. The letters were cumulative and dangerously accused Ray 
of unfounded misconduct unrelated to the gifts. 
The Decree and Judgment on Verdict should be affirmed 
and Appellee should be awarded his costs pursuant to Rule 34 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED: December /*/ , 1990. 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
Palmer 
fobinson 
Attorneys for Appellee, 
Raymond A. Ebert 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of December, 
1990, a copy of the Brief of Appellee was hand-delivered to: 
J. Richard Bell 
BELL & BELL 
303 East 2100 South 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM, 
Deceased. 
PETITION FOR 
AND REMOVAL OF 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AND 
TRUSTEE AND APPOINTMENT OF 
SUCCESSOR 
Probate No. P-83-695 
PETITIONER, The Saint Mark's Episcopal Cathedral Parish, 
states and represents to the Court that: 
1. Clarence I. Justheim, deceased, as Grantor, and 
|Raymond A. Ebert, as Trustee, entered into a trust agreement on 
June 22, 1978 (the "Trust"), the Trustee of which Trust is the 
sole beneficiary of the estate. Attached hereto and incorporated 
herein is a copy of what is^believed to be such trust and all of 
the amendments thereto. 
2. Petitioner believes that it is a residuary 
beneficiary of the Trust, and as such, is a person interested in 
the estate and Trust. 
3. Raymond A. Ebert was appointed personal 
representative of the decedent on July 22, 1983, by the Court in 
informal proceedings. 
LAW OFFICES 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
EIGHTH FLOOR CONTINENTAL BANK BUILOING 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101 
4. Raymond A. Ebert is the named and acting Trustee of 
the Trust• 
5. Cause for removal of Raymond A. Ebert as personal 
representative and Trustee of the Trust exists because the best 
interests of the estate and Trust would be served by such removal 
in that Raymond A, Ebert, as personal representative and/or 
Trustee, has apparently misappropriated valuable assets of the 
estate and trust by causing such assets to be wrongfully 
distributed to himself, and his wife and children. 
6. The following individuals, as heirs, designees and 
beneficiaries of the Trust, are interested persons of the estate 
and Trust, entitled to notice of the requested hearing: 
NAME 
Margaret L. Justheim 








123 2nd Avenue 
Salt Lake City, 
UT 84103 
2338 East 3740 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 














Genie H. Nicodemus Residuary 
Beneficiary of 
the Trust 
20 Chanell Lake 
Tiburon, CA 94920 
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2338 East 3740 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 
c/o J. Richard Bell, Esq. 
303 East 2100 South 
Unknown 
Unknown 
3507 Wrangler Way 
Park City, UT 84060 
231 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 
231 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 
7. The statements in the application or petition for 
appointment of informal probate are hereby adopted except to the 
extent that they relate to the qualification and priority of 
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Raymond A. Ebert and except to the partial list of individuals 
entitled to notice, 
8, First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., formerly Walker 
Bank and Trust, is qualified to succeed as personal representative 
and has priority because there is no other person with a prior or 
equal right. Walker Bank and Trust is nominated in the decedentfs 
will as successor personal representative, 
9, First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A. is qualified to 
succeed as Trustee and has equal priority because no successor 
Trustee has been named in the Trust. 
10, Petitioner has been informed that other 
beneficiaries of the Trust will consent and join in this petition. 
WHEREFORE, petitioner requests that: 
1. The Court fix a time and place for hearing. 
2. The Court designate what persons, if any, are to be 
given notice of the petition and hearing in addition to Raymond A. 
Ebert, personal representative. 
3. Raymond A. Ebert be removed as personal 
representative and as Trustee. 
4. First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A. be appointed as 
successor personal representative and, upon qualification and 
acceptance, be issued letters. 
5. First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A. be appointed as 
successor Trustee. 
6. Raymond A. Ebert be required to prepare and submit an 
accounting and to deliver all of the assets and records of the 
- 4 -
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FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
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estate and Trust respectively to First Interstate Bank of Utah, 
N.A. and petitioner. 
DATED this ^ day of Ju*v£~ 1984. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
a Professional Corporation 




'Attorneys for Petitioner 
UjV&JUCiAAN^-. Mk ^ t>u^^ vV-^ AfL 
VERIFICATION 
JTATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF 
The petitioner, being sworn, says that the facts set 
forth in the foregoing petition are accurate and complete to the 
best of the petitioner's knowledge and belief. 
THE SAINT MARK'S EPISCOPAL 
CATHEDRAL PARISH 
By IbajLLoLAA^t:. |V • > * » > . 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on the /"^day 
of ^ / ^ , 1984. 
uj-e ±Ls 
My Commission Expires: 
*/**/* ? 
t ^ J ^ w , c / / c i x 
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ORDER SETTING DATE FOR HEARING AND FOR NOTICE 
IT IS ORDERED that the hearing requested in the foregoing 
petition be held on the day of , 1984
 f at 
.m. , in this Court, and that notice of such hearing be given 
to all interested persons in the manner required by the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code. 
DATED this day of , 1984. 




FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
EIGHTH FLOOR CONTINENTAL BANK BUILDING 
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TabB 
Joseph J. Palmer (#2505), 
Jeffrey Robinson (#4129), of 
M0YLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Raymond A. Ebert 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1915 
Telephone: (801) 521-0250 
FILER DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
•vf*v>;-4.y VyrirK 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of 
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM, 
Deceased. 
SUPPLEMENTAL PRETRIAL ORDER 
Probate No, 83-695 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
On Thursday, June 8, 1989, a pretrial conference was 
held before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy pursuant to Rule 16 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Joseph J. Palmer and 
Jeffrey Robinson appeared as counsel for Raymond A. Ebert, 
personal representative. J. Richard Bell appeared as legal 
counsel for respondents, Priscilla Knight, as personal 
representative of the Estate of Charles Justheim, Madelaine L. 
Harris, Patricia J. Brown, St. Mark's Episcopal Cathedral Parish 
and Dean of St. Mark's Episcopal Cathedral Parish. The following 
action was taken: 
mb.jrjupp-lor.dj 
This matter arises by reason of the heirs1 Removal 
Petition and Mr. Ebert's Objections thereto. Notice thereof was 
given all interested parties and they were thereafter placed on 
this Court's trial calendar. To assist the Court in framing the 
applicable issues for trial before the Court, the parties 
submitted a Pretrial Order on October 30, 1984. A copy is 
attached as Exhibit A. On May 26, 1986, the heirs submitted and 
all parties agreed to a proposed amendment to the Pretrial Order. 
A copy is attached as Exhibit B. The Removal Petition and the 
Pretrial Orders framed two issues: (1) the removal of Mr. Ebert 
as personal representative of the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim; 
and (2) the challenge to two intervivos gifts to Mr. Ebert of 
151,143 shares of stock in Wyoming Petroleum Company. Mr. 
Ebert's objections to the Removal Petition prayed for 
confirmation of the Wyoco stock gifts to him. 
Prior to trial in 1986, the parties stipulated that the 
Court might reserve for later determination the issue of whether 
Mr. Justheim made valid intervivos gifts of the Wyoming Petroleum 
Company common stock to Mr. Ebert, and that the parties might 
offer further evidence on that issue, and the court so ordered 
(see pg. 3 of Findings of Fact of 7/31/86). On May 27, 28, 29, 
30, June 3, 23, 25, July 21 and 28, 1986, this Court tried the 
issue of Mr. Ebert's removal as personal representative based on 
the issues as framed by the amended Pretrial Order. On July 31, 
1986, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered which 
resolved the issues relating to Mr. Ebert's removal as personal 
mb.jrjupp-tor.cij £ 
representative, A copy is attached as Exhibit C. Based on the 
October 30, 1984 Pretrial Order, the May 26, 1986 Amendment and 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by this Court 
on July 31, 1986, the only issues of fact now before this Court 
are paragraphs A through H of Section IV and the only issues of 
law now before the Court are paragraphs A through D and F of 
Section V of the Pretrial Order of October 30, 1984. 
DATED: June f 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
f. 
The Honorable Michael' R. 
District Court Judge 
urphy 
APPROVED BY: 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
Jd's^h/J. /Palmer 
/Jef/rey Rotfinson 
Attorneys for Raymond A. Ebert, 
Personal Representative 
BELL & BELL 
'^LLJLJ/^SLXJL 
f J\. Richard Bell 
Attorney for Heirs and 
^ Beneficiaries 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on June _ £ _ , 1989, a copy of the 
Supplemental Pretrial Order was hand-delivered to: 
J. Richard Bell 
BELL & BELL 
303 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Attorneys for Heirs and 
Beneficiaries 
Kent M. Kasting 
DART, ADAMSON AND KASTING 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Douglas C. Mortensen 
MATHESON, JEPPSON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Clark P. Giles 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
mb.jrjupp-tor.cij 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of : 
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM, : PRETRIAL ORDER 
Deceased. : Civil No. P-83-695 
_ _ _j ___: (Judge Fishier) 
IT IS ORDERED: 
I. Petitioners seek in this Action to: 
A. Recover from respondent Raymond A. Ebert (hereinafter 
"Ebert") and his donees, for the benefit of the Estate of Clarence 
I. Justheim, 151,143 shares of Wyoming Petroleum stock claimed to 
have been the subject of a gift from Clarence I. Justheim 
(hereinafter "Justheim") to Ebert. 
B. Remove Ebert as Trustee of each of the Trusts created 
or to be created pursuant to the Justheim intervivos trust, dated 
June 22, 1978, as amended (hereinafter collectively the "Justheim 
Trust"). 
C. Remove Ebert as personal representative of the Estate 
of Clarence I. Justheim (hereinafter the "Justheim Estate"). 
II. Contentions of the Parties: 
A. Petitioners claim: (1) that Ebert improperly caused 
151,143 shares of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation, assets of either 
EXHIBIT A 
the Justheim Estate or the Justheim Trust, to be transferred into 
his and his donees' names; (2) that said stock was never given to 
Ebert by Justheim either during Justheim's life or by a valid 
testimentary transfer; (3) that Ebert obtained possession of the 
stock certificates either in his capacity as trustee to the 
Justheim Trust, as confidential advisor or fiduciary to Justheim, 
as conservator to Justheim, or as personal representative to the 
Justheim Estate; (4) that in the event Justheim did give all or 
part of said stock to Ebert, such gift or gift were made as a 
result of undue influence by Ebert in his position as trustee, 
confidential advisor or fiduciary to Justheim, or that said gift 
or gifts were given to Ebert not in his individual capacity, but 
as trustee of the Justheim Trust, or that such gift or gifts were 
not intended by Justheim to take effect until after Justheim's 
death; (5) that Ebert, as personal representative of the Justheim 
Estate, should have sought court approval of the alleged gifts 
prior to the transfer of said shares into Ebert1s and his donees1 
names; (6) that Ebert, as personal representative, has committed 
misfeasance in his untimely filing of a federal gift tax return 
reporting the alleged gift or gifts and in the valuation of said 
stock contained in said gift tax return; (7) that Ebert has 
otherwise misrepresented the value of said stock in documents 
filed with the Court; and (8) that Ebert should be removed as 
personal representative of the Justheim Estate as trustee of the 
Justheim Trust as a result of the above actions. 
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B. Respondent claims: 
This proceeding is instigated by John H. Morgan, Jr. 
("Morgan") who directly or through his attorneys, solicited the 
Petitioners to file the Petition and is paying all costs and 
attorneys' fees, Morgan did so because Ebert is unwilling to 
invest Justheim funds he controls in fiduciary capacities in 
Morgan dominated enterprises as decedent did during his life. 
Morgan considers it to be in his business interest to effect the 
removal of Ebert from all fiduciary capacities in which he makes 
or will make investment decisions with respect to assets owned by 
decedent at the time of his death. In particular, respondent 
claims: 
1. That he had known Justheim and been associated in 
business ventures with him for approximately 40 years before 
Justheim1s death. 
2. During the last 5 years of Justheim's life (after 
Justheim was injured in a 1978 car accident), respondent 
voluntarily, without compensation, went to Justheim's home on a 
daily basis and assisted him in business and personal affairs 
including care for Justheim's invalid and incompetent wife, and 
respondent considered himself to be Justheim's closest personal 
friend. 
3. Justheim had no children and for many years had had 
no significant contact or continuing relationship with any members 
of his immediate family, except his wife. Justheim adequately 
provided for his wife in his will and respondent promised Justheim 
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he would watch over Justheim's wife. Hence, respondent was a 
natural object of Justheim's bounty. 
4. Justheim, on his own account, for that of Justheim 
Petroleum Company, in which he had a controlling stock position 
and as a director of Wyoming Petroleum Company ("Wyco"), had 
invested hundreds of thousands of dollars in Morgan dominated 
enterprises between 1975 and 1983; and none of those investments 
had been the source of any return by the time of Justheim's 
death. Morgan frequently visited Justheim after the 1978 car 
accident when Justheim was confined to his home. Morgan was the 
dominant person in a confidential relationship with Justheim; he 
intimidated and bullied Justheim and influenced him unfairly to 
take actions favorable to Morgan. Justheim was afraid and 
resentful of Morgan, recognized he was being manipulated by 
Morgan, and planned to assure that Morgan's domination of 
Justheim's estate did not continue beyond Justheim's death. 
5. Justheim and John Morgan, Sr., Morgan's father, had 
each owned or controlled the same number of Wyco shares and 
together held about 90% of its outstanding stock. After Morgan 
Sr.'s death in February of 1982, Justheim purchased additional 
Wyco stock to control it, and thereafter Morgan hounded Justheim 
to sell him one-half the additional stock. Justheim acquired the 
stock to prevent Morgan from raiding Wyco's treasury for Morgan's 
limited partnerships, and his desire to assure that result as well 
as his desire to show appreciation for Ebert's friendship 
motivated Justheim to make the gifts here in question. 
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6. Justheim gave his Wyco stock to Ebert by handing him 
120,431 shares around May 15, 1981 and 30,712 shares about May 4, 
1982 (the former were endorsed off, the latter were not) and 
expressed donative intent in each case, and he directed Ebert not 
to have the shares transferred into his hame until after 
Justheim's death, but to keep the gift secret so that Justheim 
would not have to endure repeated confrontation with Morgan, Jr. 
; The transfer of the stock was not a matter of practical 
consequence because Wyco had not held shareholders meetings, paid 
dividends or held formal directors meetings for many years. The 
Wyco stock was only a small portion of Justheim's estate. 
7. Justheim discussed his intent to make such gifts and 
his motives with his attorney, Frank J. Allen, and they seemed 
perfectly appropriate to Allen. Allen had such a relationship 
with Justheim that Allen would have spoken up if the gifts had not 
seemed appropriate. 
8. The 5/29/81 codicil to Justheim's will, which gave to 
Ebert all of Justheim's Wyco stock, while invalid as a codicil 
i because it is not witnessed, further evidences the gifts, and when 
I Justheim made the second gift in 1982, he told Ebert that 
endorsement was not necessary because of the codicil. 
J 9. Ebert was not a fiduciary of Justheim's until April, 
1983 when he was appointed conservator of Justheim's estate, 
though Ebert in 1978 signed Justheim's Trust Agreement to 
establish, for $25.00, a "pourover" trust to receive the residue 
I of Justheim's estate on his death. 
10. Shortly after Justheim's death, Ebert discussed the 
facts surrounding the Wyco stock gifts with Allen, and concurred 
with Allen's advice that those facts would be submitted to the 
Probate Court for a determination as to the validity of the gifts 
when the Inventory was filed. The Inventory was complicated, 
appraisals of the inventoried assets were difficult to obtain, 
delaying the filing of the Inventory until November, 1984. 
11. The Inventory, and the estate and gift tax returns, 
while signed by Ebert, were prepared under the direction and 
advice of Clyde, Pratt, Gibbs and Cahoon, Frank J. Allen and 
Richard C. Cahoon in particular as counsel, and DeNiro & Thorne, 
Certified Public Accountants, and the valuations stated therein 
represent their advice and are reasonable valuations for the 
purposes intended thereby. 
12. Morgan, Jr., upon learning of the gift of the Wyco 
stock to Ebert went to Jay B. Bell of Fabian & Clendenin, his 
longstanding counsel, to see about attacking it with the object 
being to create a claim to remove Ebert as trustee, which would 
result in Ebert's removal as President of Wyco and of Justheim 
Petroleum, in which Morgan was an investor and director until 
Ebert caused him to be removed, that Morgan, Jr. is in fact paying 
the fees of Fabian & Clendenin in prosecuting this demand petition 
in the name of Fabian's longstanding client, ST. Mark's Cathedral; 
and the other petitioners are represented by J.R. Bell, father of 
Jay B. Bell. 
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13. Justheim intended and desired that Ebert be his 
personal representative and trustee at the time he made gifts of 
the Wyco stock, and that regardless of the validity of the gifts, 
no grounds exist for removal of Ebert because Justheim, having 
been fully aware of the potential conflict between Morgan, Jr. and 
Ebert as to the ownership and control of Wyco, nevertheless 
appointed him trustee and therefore Ebert may be removed only for 
demonstrated abuse of power detrimental to the trust, and not 
merely because he claims the gift. Respondent claims that in 
answering ownership of the stock, he is carrying out the intent of 
Justheim in keeping the stock from the influence and control of 
Morgan. 
III. Uncontested Facts: 
A. On June 22, 1978, Clarence I. Justheim, as trustor, 
and Ebert as trustee, created a $25.00 "pour-over" trust, 
identified above as the "Justheim Trust". 
B. On June 22, 1978, Justheim also executed a Last Will 
and Testament (hereinafter the "Justheim Will"), under which Ebert 
was named to serve as personal representative of the Justheim 
Estate upon Justheim's death. 
C. Under the Justheim Will, all of Justheim's property, 
except his personal effects and property previously transferred to 
the Justheim Trust during Justheim's life, was bequeathed to Ebert 
as Trustee of the Justheim Trust, to be administered and 
distributed by Ebert according to the terms of said Trust. 
-7-
D. Petitioners are beneficiaries under the Justheim 
Trust. 
E. On June 22, 1978, Justheim owned 127,743 shares of 
Wyoming Petroleum Corporation stock represented by the following 
certificates: 













F. In the spring of 1982, Justheim acquired an 
additional 23,400 shares of Wyoming Petroleum stock as follows: 




G. On April 13, 1983, Ebert was appointed Guardian of 
the Person and Conservator of the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim, 
a protected person. 
H. Justheim died on July 3, 1983. 
I. Following the death of Clarence Justheim the Justheim 
Will was informally probated and Ebert informally appointed as 
personal representative of the Justheim Estate. 
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J, At such time, a typewritten document purporting to be 
a codicil to the Justheim Will (hereinafter the "codicil11) was 
given to the Court but was not informally probated. The codicil 
is dated May 29, 1981, is unwitnessed and purports to bequeath to 
Ebert all of Justheim1s stock in Wyoming Petroleum Corporation. 
K. On or about October 24, 1983, Ebert delivered all of 
the above-described certificates of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation 
stock to the transfer agent and asked that they be, and they were, 
transferred into Ebert1 s name and into the names of various 
members of his family. Ebert now claims that he and his family 
own the stock. 
L. On October 3, 1984, Ebert as Personal Representative 
of the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim signed and caused to be 
filed with the IRS a Federal Gift Tax Return prepared by Clyde & 
Pratt, and John Deniro, pertaining to the alleged 1981 gift of 
120,431 shares of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation stock, which 
return valued said stock at $30,108. 
M. On October 16, 1984, Ebert as Personal Representative 
of the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim filed with the Court an 
Inventory of the property of said Estate, prepared by Clyde & 
Pratt, and John DeNiro which says Ebert claims that Justheim gave 
to Ebert 120,431 shares of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation stock in 
the Spring of 1981, and an additional 30,712 shares in the Spring 
of 1982. Said stock is valued at $37,826.00 in said Inventory. 
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IV. Contested Issues of Fact: 
A. Did Justheim deliver to Ebert any of the stock 
certificates in controversy with the present intent to make a gift 
of such stock to Ebert? 
B. Did Justheim intend that any gift or gifts not take 
effect until Justheim's death? 
C. Was Ebert a person to whom Justheim would naturally 
give such stock; does any evidence, independent of Ebert1s 
possession of the certificates, exist to corrobrate the gift? 
D* Did Ebert accept dominion and control over said stock 
at the time any gift or gifts were made or attempted? 
E. If Justheim gave any of the stock certificates to 
Ebert, was Justheim intending to make a gift to Ebert individually 
or to Ebert as trustee of the Justheim Trust? 
F. Did Ebert procure any transfer of stock by exercising 
undue influence over Justheim? 
G. Was Ebert a fiduciary to, a confidential advisor to, 
or in a confidential relationship with Justheim? 
H. If there were any gift or gifts of stock from 
Justheim to Ebert, were the gifts fair in all respects? 
I. Did Ebert fail to exercise reasonable care as a 
fiduciary in administering Justheim1s estate? 
J. Did Ebert act in conflict of interest in 
administering Justheim1s estate? 
K. Has Ebert misstated the value of the stock in the 
Inventory filed with the Court and in the Federal Gift Tax Return? 
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L. Has Ebert acted improperly in his untimely filing of 
the gift tax return reporting said alleged gift? 
M. Is this removal petition in fact processed by John H. 
Morgan, Jr. to further his own business interest? 
V. Contested Issues of Law: 
A. Were there any effective inter vivos gifts of stock 
of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation from Justheim to Ebert. 
B. At the times the alleged gifts were made, did Ebert 
owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty and care to Clarence Justheim and 
to the Justheim Trust? 
C. Are the claimed gifts of stock presumptively invalid 
by reason of Ebertfs relationship with Justheim. 
D. Are the claimed gifts of stock presumed to be a 
transfer to Ebert as trustee rather than a gift to Ebert 
individually? 
E. Does reasonable cause exist for Ebert's removal as 
Trustee of the Justheim Trust and as Personal Representative of 
the Justheim Estate. 
F. Are the gifts presumptively valid from Ebert's 
possession of the certificates and other surrounding circumstances? 
VI. Exhibits: 
All exhibits shall be exchanged by the parties prior to 
trial. 
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VII . Wi tnesses : 
A, Petitioners 
1. Petitioners will call the following witnesses: 
a. Raymond A. Ebert 
b. Frank Allen 
c. Michael Bennion 
2. Petitioners may call the following witnesses: 
a. John Morgan 
b. Richard Cahoon 
c. John DeNiro 
d. Steven White 
e. Wayne Elggren 
f. Dr. John Henrie 
3. Petitioners may use the following depositions: 
a. Dr. John Henrie 
B. Respondent may call any of the above, and 
I a. Florence Tierney 
b. Fran Albreicht 
« VIII. Discovery is complete. 
IX. Trial Briefs are to be filed with the Clerk and copies 
furnished to opposing counsel by . 
This matter is set for pretrial conference on 
Estimated time of trial is four days. 
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X. The foregoing admissions having been made by the parties, and 
the parties having specified the foregoing issues of fact and law 
remaining to be litigated, this order shall supplement the 
pleadings and govern the course of the trial of this case, unless 
modified to prevent manifest injustice. 
DATED this day of , 1984. 







Joseph J. Palmer 
Frank J. Allen 
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J. RICHARD BELL 
JACQUE B. BELL 
BELL & BELL 
303 East 2100 South 
Sa l t Lake C i ty , Utah 84115 
Telephone 487-7756 
Attorneys for Heirs and Beneflciarles_ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ) 
NOTICE OF AMENDMENT TO 
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM, ) PRE-TRIAL ORDER 
Deceased. ) Probate No. P-83-695 
The Honorable Philip R. Fishier 
Notice is hereby given that the attorneys for Priscilla 
Knight as Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles Justheira, 
Madelalne L. Harris, Patricia J. Brown; and two of the beneficiaries 
under the trust: Dean of St. Marks Episcopal Cathedral Parish and 
St. Marks Episcopal Cathedral Parish, move to amend the Pre-Trial 
Order entered by this Court on the 30th day of October, 1984, at 
page 2 by adding the following: 
(9) Ebert has misrepresented the size of the estate to the 
heirs and beneficiaries; 
(10) Ebert failed to give notice to heirs and beneficiaries 
as required by law. 
(11) Ebert has been deceptive and secretive and has followed 
a course of conduct in his capacity as Personal Representative as 
above set forth which is not in the best interests of the Estate. 
(12) Ebertfs many positions as Personal Representative 
EXHIBIT B 
and Trustee under the Trust of the Estate of Clarence I. Justhelm, 
Personal Representative and Trustee under the Trust of the Estate 
of Margaret Justheira; Conservator and Guardian of Margaret Justheim; 
stockholder, President and Director of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation; 
stockholder, President and Director of Justheira Petroleum Corporation; 
causes him, Ebert, to be in so many potentially conflicting interests 
situations as to require his removal as being in the best Interests 
of the Estate. 
Oral notice of this proposed Amendment has been given to 
adverse party in keeping with the Court's oral Order to respond to 
to oral Interrogatories. 
Dated this 26th day of May, 1986. 
BELL 8c BELL, by 
J . RfcEarcJ BelT 
MAILING_CERTIFICATE 
A true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed this 26th 
day of May, 1986, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Joseph J. Palmer, Esq. 
Moyle Sc Draper 
600 Deseret Plaza 
If 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and 
W. Cullen Battle Esq. 
Fabian and Clendenin 
12th Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411-2309 
-2-
and 
Frank J. Allen, Esq. 
Clyde, Pratt, Glbbs S. Cahoon 
77 West 72nd South, No. 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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FILMED 
Joseph J. Palmer (#2505) of 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Raymond A. Ebert 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1901 
Telephone (801) 521-0250 
FiuCD u i» r\ n 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM, 
Deceased. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Probate No. P-83-695 
(The Honorable Philip R. 
Fishier) 
* * * * * * * 
This action came on regularly for trial before the 
Honorable Philip R. Fishier, sitting without a jury, on May 27, 
28, 29, 30, and June 3, for closing argument on June 23, for 
the Court's initial ruling on June 25, and for further argument 
and the Court's final ruling on July 21 and 28, 1986. J. 
Richard Bell appeared for certain Beneficiaries: Priscilla 
Knight as Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles 
Justheim, Madelaine L. Harris, Patricia J. Brown, St. Mark's 
EXHIBIT C 
ADDENDUM - A 
Episcopal Cathedral Parish and Dean of St. Mark's Episcopal 
Cathedral (hereafter "Knight-Church"). Kent M. Kasting 
appeared for himself as Guardian Ad Litem for Margaret L. 
Justheim, a Beneficiary, Clark P. Giles appeared for 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a Beneficiary. Frank J. 
Allen appeared for Raymond A. Ebert, as Personal Representative 
of the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim. Joseph J. Palmer 
appeared for Raymond A. Ebert, as Personal Representative and 
as an individual (hereafter "Ebert"). 
The action came on based upon the Petition of Knight-Church 
for Removal of Raymond A. Ebert as Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim (hereafter "Estate") and as 
Trustee of the inter vivos trusts created or to be created 
pursuant to the Justheim Trust dated June 22, 1978, as amended 
(hereafter "Trust"), and further based upon the Pretrial Order 
of October 30, 1984 as supplemented by the Knight-Church Notice 
of Amendment, dated May 26, 1986. 
At the inception of trial, Charles M. Bennett appeared for 
John M. Morgan, Jr. (-Morgan"). Ebert objected to the standing 
of Morgan to appear. Based upon the oral stipulation of all 
parties in open court, the issue of Morgan's standing was 
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reserved, and he was permitted to appear for the limited 
purpose of joining in the Knight-Church Removal Petitions. The 
latter and Morgan are hereafter referred to as "Petitioners". 
The parties stipulated that the Court would reserve and not 
now determine the issue of whether Clarence I. Justheim made 
valid inter vivos gifts of 151,143 shares of Wyoming Petroleum 
Company ("Wyoco*) common stock to Ebert and that the parties 
might offer further evidence on that issue. These Findings and 
Conclusions are not intended to be the findings and conclusions 
on that issue. Petitioners did, however, offer evidence on 
their claims that one reason, among others, Ebert should be 
removed is because the gifts of the Wyoco stock were invalid. 
Based upon the evidence, and the parties having rested and 
submitted memoranda and closing argument, and the Court being 
fully advised, the Court now makes and enters these: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Parties established the following facts by a 
preponderance of the evidence: 
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A. Ebert was Clarence's closest personal friend for 
many years, Ebert began working for Clarence as "an 
administrative assistant, courier, confidant and general right 
hand man'- (Exhibit 32) in late 1978 following an automobile 
accident involving Clarence. Mr. Ebert continued in that 
capacity until Clarence's death in July 1983. 
B. In helping Clarence, Ebert assumed a position of 
some trust and confidential responsibility. Clarence depended 
on Ebert for many business and personal matters and trusted him 
without reservation. Ebert did not have a position of 
superiority or dominance over Clarence. 
C. Clarence's foremost concern in the last few years 
of his life was the care of his wife Margaret. Margaret was 
substantially incapable of taking care of her affairs during 
the relevant time period. 
D. Clarence was concerned that he could not take care 
of Margaret. Clarence sought the help of friends and 
associates. 
E. Clarence was a demanding and dominating person. 
As he grew older, he became increasingly difficult to work 
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with. As a result, several nurses hired after his accident in 
November 1978 quit their jobs. 
F. In order to induce people to help him, Clarence 
began to make promises to his friends and associates in order 
to obtain their cooperation. 
G. With regard to Ebert, Clarence stated on several 
occasions that he would take care of Ebert. 
H. On May 29, 1981, Clarence executed a document 
purported*to be a codicil which he had asked Ebert to type. 
The purported codicil devised all of Clarence's Wyoming 
Petroleum stock to Ebert. However, the codicil was not 
witnessed. 
I. The Wyoming Petroleum stock was a valuable asset 
to Clarence. Early in 1981, Clarence asked his attorney, Frank 
Allen, if he could make a gift of Wyoco stock to Ebert without 
transferring it on the corporate books because Clarence did not 
want Morgan to know of it. Allen told Clarence he could make a 
valid gift of stock by handing Ebert the certificates and 
declaring that he was giving it to him, and that the 
certificates should be endorsed or a stock power should be 




J. After Clarence died, Ebert learned from Frank 
Allen, who was appointed as his attorney as personal 
representative of the estate, that the codicil was invalid for 
lack of witnesses. 
K. Ebert claimed that Clarence gave him 120,431 
shares of Wyoco stock on May 15, 1981, which left Clarence with 
6,312 shares. Ebert claimed Clarence told him not to transfer 
the certificates into his name until after his death and to 
keep the fact of the gifts secret because Clarence did not want 
Morgan to find out about the gifts. 
L. John Morgan, Sr. ("Morgan Sr.") died in February 
1982; then he, family members and others and Clarence, his 
family members and others, each owned approximately the same 
number of shares of Wyoco. 
M. Immediately following Morgan Sr.'s death, Clarence 
determined that the agreement between him and Morgan Sr. to 
keep an equal number of shares was no longer valid, and 
Clarence further determined to obtain additional stock of Wyoco 
in order to obtain control of the corporation. 
N. Ebert assisted Clarence in this endeavor by 
checking shareholder lists and by making several trips to 
Wyoming to obtain 20,000 shares of stock and an additional 
3,400 shares from New Jersey which represented the -control 
stock-. 
- 6 -
O. Shortly after the •'control stock" was obtained by 
Clarence, Ebert claimed Clarence gave Ebert an additional 
30,712 shares of Wyoco. These shares represented the -control 
stock- and the remaining 6,312 shares of the stock remaining 
with Clarence after the claimed first gift. Ebert claimed 
Clarence again told him not to transfer the certificates into 
his name and to keep the fact of the gifts secret because 
Clarence did not want Morgan to find out about the gifts. 
P. Both Ebert and Allen testified that, in July or 
August 1983, Ebert told Allen the facts about the purported 
gifts. Allen told Ebert that in his opinion, if the Court 
determined the facts to be as Ebert claimed, each of the gifts 
was probably valid even if unendorsed and that the codicil had 
some probative value to prove the gifts. Allen told Ebert, 
however, that all of the facts would have to be disclosed to 
the Court and the Court would have to determine if the gifts 
were valid. Neither Ebert nor Allen disclosed the facts 
surrounding the alleged gifts to either the court or the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the estate until after a petition was 
brought by St. Mark's Church in June 1984, seeking the recovery 




Q. Without approval of the Court or notice to his 
attorney or the estate's ultimate beneficiaries, Ebert 
transferred the disputed stock to himself and members of his 
family on October 24, 1983, When he did so, Ebert believed 
that he and Allen would cause all of the facts supporting 
Ebert's gift claims to be submitted to and determined by the 
Court, In October 1984, Ebert and his family caused all of the 
stock to be deposited with Allen pending this Court's final 
determination of the gift claims. 
R. To transfer the stock to himself and his family, 
Ebert delivered the disputed stock certificates to the transfer 
agent for Wyoming Petroleum with two letters dated October 24, 
1983. Some of the stock certificates presented for transfer 
had not been endorsed. Ebert included a copy of the codicil 
which Ebert knew was invalid. Ebert referred to the codicil in 
the letter that accompanied the unsigned stock certificates and 
stated that: -The Codicil bequeathed to me all of Clarence I. 
Justheim's interest in Wyoming Petroleum Corp." Ebert intended 
that the transfer agent rely upon the codicil in transferring 
the stock to Ebert. Ebert was relying on the advice Allen had 
given him in July or August 1983 in so doing. 
S. Ebert is currently the personal representative of 
the estate, the conservator of Margaret Justheim's estate, the 
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largest individual shareholder in Justheim Petroleum (other 
than the estate), the president and a director of Justheim 
Petroleum, and the president and a director of Wyoming 
Petroleum. Clarence anticipated and intended Ebert would be 
the personal representative of his estate. 
T. Allen is currently the secretary, a director and a 
shareholder of Justheim Petroleum, the attorney for Justheim 
Petroleum, the attorney for Ebert as personal representative of 
the estate, and the attorney for Ebert as the conservator of 
Margaret Justheim. Allen was secretary, a director and a 
shareholder of Justheim Petroleum during Clarence's life, and 
was Clarence's personal attorney. 
2. The Petitioners failed to prove the following 
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence: 
A. That Ebert improperly caused 151,143 shares of 
Wyoco common stock to be transferred into his and his donees' 
names. 
B. That Wyoco stock was never given to Ebert by 
Clarence during Clarence's life, that the Wyoco stock was given 
to Ebert in his capacity as trustee of the Trust, or that these 
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gifts were intended by Clarence to take effect after Clarence's 
death. 
C. That these gifts were made as a result of undue 
influence by Ebert in his position as trustee, confidential 
advisor or fiduciary to Clarence. 
D. That Ebert, as Personal Representative of the 
Justheim Estate, should have sought court approval of the 
alleged gifts prior to the transfer of the Wyoco shares into 
Ebert's and his donees' names. 
E. That the Petitioners were damaged by Ebert#s 
transfer of the Wyoco stock to himself and his donees. 
F. That Ebert, as Personal Representative, committed 
misfeasance with regard to the time of filing of a federal gift 
tax return reporting the alleged gift or gifts and in the 
valuation of the Wyoco stock in the gift tax return. 
G. That Ebert otherwise misrepresented the value of 
the Wyoco stock in documents filed with the Court. 
H. That Ebert misrepresented the size of the estate 
to the heirs and beneficiaries. 
I. That Ebert failed to give notice to heirs and 
beneficiaries as required by law. 
J, That Ebert has been deceptive, misleading, 
secretive, or has followed a course of conduct in his capacity 
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a Personal Representative which is not in the best interests of 
the Estate-
K. That Ebert's positions as Personal Representative 
and Trustee of the Estate and the Trust of Clarence I. 
Justheim, Personal Representative and Trustee of the Estate and 
the Trust of Margaret Justheim, Conservator and Guardian of 
Margaret Justheim, stockholder, president and director of 
Wyoming Petroleum Corporation, stockholder, president and 
director of Justheim Petroleum Corporation, are such 
potentially conflicting interests as to require his removal in 
the best interests of the Estate. 
L. That Ebert has failed to timely pursue and 
discover assets and potential assets of the Estate, 
M, That Ebert has failed to account for assets or 
potential assets of the Estate. 
N. That Ebert has attempted to conceal or cover up 
the basis of his claim to the gifts of Wyoco stock. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes and enters these: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Ebert did not haw? a confidential relationship with 
£/. The Court concludes that the Petitioners have failed 
fto show by a preponderance of the evidence: 
A. that Ebert has breached any duty to the estate; or 
B. that it is in the best interests of the Estate of 
Clarence I. Justheim that Ebert be removed as Personal 
Representative of the Estate or as Trustee of the 
Trusts created by Clarence I. Justheim under Trust 
>nt dated June 22, 1978, as amended. 
ThereTcTre/ "the Petition to remove Ebert should be denied. 
Dated 3 / , n&<> 
BY THE COURT 
CDN3660B 
p R. Fishier 
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Li ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
Q, VCUFPK 
Ooput/Ciork 
I- hereby certify that a Liue and Correct: OOpy ot 
.^ •e-rcgmhlj 1:1ND1NG3 OF FACT and CQMCLU3ION3 OF LAW wre—t«nd 
dolivorod day of July,—19 86 j—to tho follow 
f^ff^^^^ **2-~~^fi T A ^ ^ ^ 
Joseph J. Palmer 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
600 Deseret Plaza 
#15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
c^>-A 
.11 
Frank J. Allen S^Af f~I 
CLYDE & PRATT yf/C6^^' ) 
77 West 200 South, ^ /ttte 200 <*/ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Kent M. Kasting 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
48 Post Office Place, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
J. Richard Bell 
303 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Clark P. Giles 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dale F. Gardiner 
1325 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
%$/M 
84115 
Carmen E. Kipp 
KIPP Sc CHRISTIAN 
32 Exchange Place, #600 





Joseph J. Palmer (#2505), and 
Jeffrey Robinson (#4129), of 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Raymond A, Ebert 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1915 
Telephone: (801) 521-0250 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 0ISTRIST COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 1 5 1989 
Deputy Cierk 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM, 
Deceased, 
STIPULATION 
Probate No. 83-695 
(Gift Issue) 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Reserving objections as to relevancy, hearsay, unfair 
prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading to the jury and waste 
of time, Raymond A. Ebert stipulates that John H. Morgan, Jr. 
wrote to Raymond A, Ebert in substance as follows: 
10/10/83: In my recent discussions with you, 
you have indicated to me that Clarence, by 
his Will or a Codicil, had given you all of 
his stock of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation. 
11/21/83: I have a copy of Clarence's Will, 
which Frank Allen gave me; it doesn't mention 
Wyoming Petroleum stock. Yet you tell me you 
have an Amendment to the Will which gives you 
all of the stock. 
1/8/84: The Codicil is not witnessed; a 
Codicil requires two witnesses to be valid, 
so I doubt Frank Allen prepared it. Who 
prepared the Codicil? 
DATED: J u n e JI 1 9 8 9 . 
MOYLE fit DRAPER, P.C 
By ^ V 
Jos(eph J. P&lmer 
Jeffrey Robinson 
Attorneys for Raymond A. 
Ebert 
Accepted: 
BELL & BELL 
J- Richard Bell 
Attorneys for Certain 
Beneficiaries 
STIPULATION ACCEPTED. 
DATED: June ' / . 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
By 
flonorable M i c h a e l R. Murphy 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t J u d g e 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM, 
Deceased. 
ORDER 
CASE NO. P-83-695 
The motion for a new trial on the gift issue is denied, 
Dated this o day of August, 1989. 
/MICHA IAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
JUSTHEIM ESTATE PAGE TWO ORDER 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Order, to the following, this j , day of 
August, 1989: 
Joseph J. Palmer 
Attorney for Raymond A. Ebert 
15 East 100 South, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1915 
J. Richard Bell 
Attorney for Beneficiaries 
303 East 2100 South 
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PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
October 10, 1983 
Mr. Raymond A. Ebert 
Director 
Justheim Petroleum Company 
2338 East 3740 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 T 3 [ ^ 
Dear Ray: 
Following up on our communication regarding Wyoming Petroleum 
Corporation, I want merely to state the facts and suggestions 
as I see them. If I am incorrect in my facts, please let me 
know. 
For more than thirty-three years, I have been associated with 
C.I. and my father in the oil and gas business in southwestern 
Wyoming and in Utah. A good part of this association, of course, 
is in the Big Piney and southwestern Wyoming development, as well 
as in the Uintah Basin development of eastern Utah. 
An important part of the Wyoming development, of course, was the 
Wyoming Petroleum Corporation. This project was a fifty/fifty 
division of interest with my dad and C.I., with each of them 
agreeing with each other that they would retain the fifty/fifty 
control of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation and in any stock ac-
quired or purchased would be owned 50% by one and 50% by the 
other. Again I have enclosed a copy of the Wyoming Petroleum 
Corporation agreement entered into September 11, 1953. 
We both know the history of this situation. Clarence purchased 
additional stock after dad's death, contrary to the spirit, as 
well as the letter of the agreement. 
I have suggested from the beginning that you and I work together 
on Wyoming Petroleum Corporation on a 50/50 basis according to 
the way that Dad and C.I. had it worked out from the beginning, 
and I still think this is a good approach and continue to sug-
gest that this is the best way to work together and to build 
the company. 
In my recent discussions with you, you have indicated to me that 
Clarence, by his Will, had given you all of his stock of Wyoming 
Petroleum Corporation. You mentioned that this was contained in 
one of the Amendments or Codicil to Clarence's Will. I have not 
EXHIBIT , ,l€ 
-/6 V . 
Mr. Raymond A. Ebert - 2 
read itf but I assume what you say is the case. 
Under all of the circumstances, you are obviously in control of 
Wyoming Petroleum Corporation. This, of course, is not the way 
that Clarence or my father envisioned that it would take place 
when they wexe working together to put Wyoming Petroleum Corpor-
ation together. 
If you want to work on a fifty/fifty basis, I believe we can 
build the company and make it a great success. This would be 
my choice, but this is up to you. 
I would suggest that you and I and perhaps Mike Bennion, if Mike 
is willing to do so, serve as Directors of the company. You can 
be the President, if you want, and I will be the Vice President 
and perhaps Mike will be the Secretary and Treasurer. But it is 
pretty much up to you as to what you want to do. 
Let me know of your decision. 
Thank you, and with all best wishes. 
Sincerely, 
/John H. Morgan, Jr. 
Coresident 
JHM/lsb 
cc: Mr. Frank J. Allen 
Mr. J. Michael Bennion 
P.S. As to regard the signing of the checks, it is my suggestion 
that both your and my signatures should be required. 
TabF 
November 21, 1983 
Mr. Raymond A. Ebert 
President 
Justheim Petroleum Company 
2339 East 3740 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Dear Ray: 
Once again I have enclosed a copy of the Agreement which C I. and 
Dad entered into on September 11, 1953 regarding Wyoming 
Petroleum Corporation and their promise to each other that if one 
of them acquired any stock of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation, that 
the other one would own it on a fifty-fifty basis. 
Including the preceding fourteen years which they had made this a 
practice, as recited in the Agreement itself, it was a total of 
almost forty-four years that they continued to keep this promise 
to each other, because of their mutual appreciation and respect 
for each other. 
Following Dad's death in February, 1982, I suggested to Clarence 
and even urged him to continue to work along on that same basis -
that any stock purchased or acquired by the other would be owned 
one-half by the other partner. In other words, that it would 
continue to be a fifty-fifty deal on Wyoming Petroleum 
Corporation. 
But for some reason Clarence purchased a block of stock 
sufficient to give him control of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation. 
Keep in mind that Dad and C I. had worked together for some 
forty-four years in trying to build that company, in which I 
helped them for thirty-three of those years. I just can't 
believe that C.I., after forty-four years of working together, 
would suddenly turn on his old partner who never one time broke a 
promise to him in all those years and deprive him and his family 
of what they are entitled to under the Agreement. 
Somebody must have talked C.I. into violating that Agreement. I 
understand you actually went up to Evanston, Wyoming and paid 
for the Wyoming Petroleum Corporation stock which gave C.I. 
control of the company. 
I have a copy of Clarence's Will which Frank Allen gave to me. 
It doesn't mention Wyoming Petroleum Corporation stock. In this 
case, it would be treated like any other personal property. It 
would go to Margaret (Chickie), and after Chickie's death, it 
would go to C-I.'s heirs, as well as to Kathryn Bradford and 
others named in Clarence's Will. There was never any mention 
t 
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Mr. Raymond A. Ebert 
11/71/83 
Page 2 
that he was giving all of that stock to you. Yet you tell mp 
that you have an Amendment to the Will which gives you all of the 
stock. On this basis you have gone in as head and President of 
Wyoming Petroleum Corporation and in full char"** *nr* r-rmt-r-rh r^ 
Wyoming Petroleum Corporation. 
I just can't believe that Clarence intended to deprive Chickie 
anH Kay and all his heirs of that stock and give it to you. 
Ray, you never lifted your finger in helping to build Wyoming 
Petroleum Corporation. It seems incredible to me that Clarence 
would change his mind and give all of that stock to you. 
On the Drilling Proposition, Ray, once again your credibility 
would be greatly enhanced if you would produce a copy of your 
canceled check (both sides) for the S5,000 which you said you put 
up on October 26, proving your 2% investment in the Drilling 
Deal. You have everything to gain and nothing to loose by 
sending copies of your canceled check to the Directors of 
Justheim Petroleum Company. 
You claim that there is now a new oil well, better than the 
others, but, Ray, even according to Frank's figures, you never 
raised anywhere near enough money to drill one well. No one has 
still heard about Dominium Oil Company who was supposed to invest 
a total of §93,750 for a 15.625% interest in the total drilling 
project. Long Petroleum Company, so far as I know, never has put 
up their $40,000 for their 25% interest in the first well 
compared to Justheim Petroleum Company's 20% for a $60,000 
investment. 
There is one other matter which I would like to bring to you 
attention. According to the copy of the Will which I have, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology was actually given the 1.5 
million shares of stock of Justheim Petroleum Company. Of 
course, there were certain conditions attached, etc. But the 
stock was actually given to them. Yet you tell me now that 
according to an Amendment to Justheim*s Will, M.I.T. doesn't get 
the stock until Chickie1s death. 
The M.I.T. representative, Mr. D. Hugh Darden, has written 
several times asking that the Personal Representative and Trustee 
furnish additional information regarding the Estate, and I have 
enclosed a copy of his latest letter. 
Ray, I would like to ask you a question: Can you see any way 
that % fairness and equity and justice can be done to Justheim 
Petroleum Company, to Wyoming Petroleum Corporation, to the 
Mr. Raymond A Ebert 
11/21/83 
Page 3 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology* to me and my family, to 
Chickie, to Kay and to Clarence's heirs? If you do, I would sure 
like to hear from you. 




John H. Morgan, Jr. 
President 
TabG 
WHker BuildmQ Sail Lake City Utah 54111 
none (MM 363-4391 or 363-6176 or 531-9264 
Decercber 4, 1983 
Mr. Raymond A. Ebert 
President 
Justheim Petroleim Ootpany 
2338 East 3740 South 
Salt lake City, Utah 84109 
Dear Ray: 13 
You continue to suggest ttot I resign as a member of the Board of Justheim 
Petroleum Ccnpany, and you tell me that I will surely be removed frcm the 
Board at the next Annual Meeting of the Stockholders. You also continue to 
mention that I have completely destroyed the harmony and unity of the Board* 
tey, let me tell you how you can achieve perfect harmony and unity with the 
Board of Directors. And you can also have my resignation inmediately. 
You can furnish us evidence that you and the oonpanies listed in Frank's 
letter to the Board of Directors of October 18, a copy enclosed, invested 
their money right along with Justheim Petroleum Ccnpany, and on the same 
terms, as porposed in I*ank's letter of the 18th. 
Now, it iray be a little difficult to get copies of the cancelled checks from 
these oarpanies* But you certainly have your cancelled checks, and this 
would be a good faith beginning. 
Then, surely there was a bank account established for the drilling fund. (The 
agreement requires this.) It would be most helpful, and it would not be dif-
ficult at all, to send a copy of the bank statement, showing the deposits, 
not only of Justheim Petroleum Ccnpany; but also your deposits and the deposits 
of the ccnpanies listed in Frank's letter of October 18. 
Hcwever, even if you got all the money listed in Rcank*s letter, and your xnoney 
as veil, it only amounts to $141,000, according to the information these com-
panies gave me concerning their investment. This isn't enough to drill a well, 
Ray. Frank tells us and CKM tells us it takes $300,000 to drill and complete 
a well to the Codell formation. 
Now, it wouldn't really be that bad if Frank and CKM got other people and 
oonpanies than those listed in Rrank's letter, to make the investment along 
with Justheim Petroleum Company, although it uould not be as represented. 
£g££T 
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But as Directors and Officers in Justheim Petroleum Carpany, we are entitled 
to know that other companies and individuals are investing right along with 
Justheim Petroleum, and en the same terms; because this is the way it was 
represented to us; and this vas the basis on which the money was invested by 
Justheim Petroleum Carpany. 
So, Ray, you have my resignation; and you can assure harmony and unity with the 
Board. All you have to do is furnish us sane iirportant information, which 
shouldn't be hard to get at all. 
Ray, in your letter to me of November 21, a copy of which went to all the Dir-
ectors, you mention that iry personal animosty to you can be explained by the 
fact that I was not appointed as Co-Personal Representative in Clarence's Will. 
No, Fay, that doesn't bother me at all. But there are things about Clarence's 
Will which bother me very much. In my letter to you of Nosraaber 21f I explained 
how I felt, and enclose a copy of my letter of November 21. 
The other Directors of Justheim Petroleum Carpany know very little about Wyoming 
Petroleum Corporation. But I think they should teve the background. It is a 
company which my Dad and Clarence put together more than 44 years ago, and it 
is growing in value every day. Dad and Clarence agreed to a 50-50 control of 
Wyoning Petroleum Corporation, pursuant to their Agreement of September 11, 1953, 
a copy of which is enclosed. 
By Agreement of September 11, 1953, they "re-affirmed their under standing and 
agreement of the previous fourteen years,- that they should control Wyoming 
Petroleum Corporation on a 50-50 basis, and that any stock purchased or aogtt&ad 
by one of them, would be owned 50% by the other one. 
I am sending a copy of this Agreement to all the Directors, together with a 
copy of my letter of November 21 to all the Directors, so that they can understand 
a little of the background, and perhaps why I am concerned about certain aspects 
of Clarence's Will; and why it really does bother me. 
You see, if there was one thing that Clarence Justheim was certain about in 
his life, it was that he was going to take care of Margaret (Chickie). Nothing 
was as important to Clarence as this—not even Justheim Petroleum Ctonpany. C.I, 
was going to nake oertain that Chickie would never go to a rest home. And that 
she would get all the attention and care that she needed for the rest of her life. 
As I explained in my No^ ranhpr ?1 latter tn ynn n mpy rvf *ho Will tJwf 1B>n8PJc * 
Ti^ltc^np rimer or™ ^ ^ ' ^ T^T-I-WI p r ^ r ^ ^ prig-y^Hr^ Ilrrier ***** cirr 
cumstances, all the stock of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation owned by Clarence ** 
would normally and naturally go to Chickie. This is important, because Wyoming 
Petroleum Corporation was and is becalming a very valuable Carpany, with its oil 
and gas royalties frcm the Big Piney Field. 
{bee <- t?&) 
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Yet, you have told me many times that Clarence gave all of that Wyoming Petroleum 
Corporation stock to you by an Anen&nent to the Will; and that FtankJw4,1^ 
ftnenctaent. 
It just seems incredible to me that Clarence would change his Will, and deprive 
Chickie of this valuable stock; and also deprive his other heirs of their porticn 
of the Stock, after Chickie passes away. One of Clarence's heirs, I understand, 
is a parapalegic who will never live a normal life, and who needs all the help 
he can get. But we would have to believe that Clarence changed his xoindr and 
wanted you to have all the stock, and his parapalegic relative. *pi4d get none. 
We would also have to believe that Clarence changed his mind, and decided to 
deprive Kathryn Bradford of her share of the stock, because Kathryn is listed 
in the Will to receive a portion of Clarence's assets. Kathryn has been Clarence'< 
devoted secretary for more than 35 years. 
We would have to believe that he changed his mind, and gave it all to you, Ray. 
Somehow, it doesn't all add up. And yet, you have gone in as President of 
Vtycming Petroleum Corporation, in full control of the Catpany. I am a Director 
and Vice President. But you oould kick me out any time you wanted to do so, 
because you have absolute control of the Ccnpany. Yet, I spent 33 years in 
trying to help Clarence and ny Dad build that Ccnpany. You didn't lift your 
little finger to build Wyoming Petroleum Corporation. Can you understand why 
I am bothered? 
Also, the copy of the Will which I have actually gives the 1.5 million stares 
of Justheim Petroleum Company to the Massachusetts Instutute of Technology, with 
you as Trustee. Yet, you tell me that according to the Amendnent to Clarence1 s 
Will, that MIT doesn't get that stock until after Chickie passes away. 
Why should Clarence want to change the Will to prevent MTT from getting that 
stock until after Chickie dies. It doesn't nake sense to me. The MIT people 
have been waiting for a long time to get the information on the Estate. You 
are the Trustee and the Personal Representative, Ray. You have the responsibility 
of sending the information to the MTT. 
Finally, Ray, in my letter to you of November 21, I ask you if you can see any 
way that fairness and justice and equity can be done to Chickie, to Justheijn 
Petroleum, to Wyoming Petroleum, to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
to Kay Bradford, to Clarence's heirs and to me and try family? The one I really 
should have included above anyone el9e is Clarence Justheim himself. 
I haven't heard anything from you, Ray. And I continue to ask you the same 
question. Can you see how fairness and justice and equity can be done iivthis 
case? 
Mr. Raymond A. flbert 
Page 4, Cent. 
I recently wrote you a letter concerning the Scdt Lake Area Chamber of Ccnmeroe, 
because I really believe that Clarence was 100% behind the QHmber of Commerce 
and its objectives, in his desire to help build the Cannunity and nake it a 
better place to live and to work. You mentioned that Justheim Petroleum 
had already made its contribution to the Chamber. I don't know what it was. 
teybe it was $100. But I think Clarence would want more than just a token 
contribution to the Chamber. Clarence loved this Community, and wanted to 
be an inportant part of its success and growth. Besides, it is an investment— 
not a contribution to a Charity. 
One of the things I would ask you to do is to consider a real investment in 
the Chamber of Canrerce—to really be a part of the growth and development 
and success of Salt lake City, and the State of Utah. 
ttiere are other ways, Ray, that you can bring fairness and justice and equity 
to those people and companies mentioned above. But that is pretty much \^p to 
you to decide. 
Enclosures: Wyoming Petroleum Corporation Agreement (Copy) 
Copy of Letter of November 21 
Copy of letter of October 18 
Copy of Letter of November 22. 
Copy of MTT Letter 
cc: Mr. Frank J. Allen 
Mr. Kenneth E. Sfriith 
Mr. Calvin P. Gaddis 
TabH 
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January 21, 1983 
Mr* Ray Ebert 
President 
Justheim Petroleum Company 
2338 East 3740 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Ray: 
I have an apology to make to you. 
In my letter of January 12, in which I sent copies to the other 
Directors, I referred to the two checks for $20,000 each which 
were written to you from Justheim Petroleum Company. Now, you 
may have the impression I was trying to connect you with some il-
legal activity. This is not the case. I don't want to leave that 
impression. At the Directors' meeting, as I recall, you said you 
did it that way in order to bait me. If this is the case, it is 
not a very mature way to conduct corporate business. I thought 
there might be some other explanation for this. If I left the 
wrong impression, I apology for this. 
Also, I want to clarify, if possible, the Will situation. I don't 
want to leave the wrong impression with you or the other Directors. 
I don't want to leave the impression that you were engaged in il-
legal activities. But we have found that the Will, or the Codicil 
to the Will, has some major defects, including the fact that it 
was not witnessed. Frank Allen has one of the best legal minds 
that I know; and no one knows better than Frank that it requires 
two witnesses for the Will to be legal. Therefore, I am certain 
that Frank did not prepare the Will, even though Frank was Clarence's 
lawyer. But I have to ask the question: Who did prepare the Will, 
or the Codicil to the Will? Clarence didn't know how to type. Ray, 
I don't know who put the Codicil to the Will together. Perhaps you 
know. Once again, I don't think there is any illegal activity, 
and I don't want to leave the impression with the other Directors 
that there is illegal activity. No doubt there is an explanation 
for this. If so, and if you feel you would like to explain it, 
I would appreciate hearing the explanation. 
Would you please consider my situation for a minute, Ray? I worked 
with'C.I. and Dad for 33 years in trying to build something worth-
while in the oil and gas business. Justheim Petroleum Co., Wyoming 
Efl 
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Petroleum Corporation and the other Companies are the results of 
this effort, in my judgment. Therefore, when I see you come in 
with really no background in trying to help build these Companiei 
and gain absolute control of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation, con-
trary to an agreement of 44 years which C.I. and Dad had honored 
all this time; and insisting that you own all of that Wyoming Pet-
roleum Corporation stock, it really gets to me. Also, I am really 
upset with the possibilities that neither Chickie nor Jack Brad-
ford nor any of Chickie's heirs or C.Ifs heirs would get any of 
that stock. It isn't fair. 
But these are the facts, Ray, as I see them. I don't want to 
leave a wrong impression with anyone, and I make more mistakes 
than most people, and no doubt I have given the wrong impression 
to you and the other Board Members. I want to leave the right 
impression, and give the facts, as I see them. Therefore, if I 
have given the wrong impression, I apologize. But I invite you, 
if you so desire, to give the facts, as you see them. 
But let me tell you something, Rays Clarence and I had some fan-
tastic battles. We really did a lot of fighting. But we always 
came up friends. We always shook hands at the end of the day. 
This was the only basis on which we could, and did, stay together. 
And of course, this was the basis on which Dad and C.I. stayed 
together for 44 years. 
I have made a lot of mistakes, Ray, much more than my share. I 
apologize for them, and hope I can do a lot better. And I hope 
you and the other Directors accept my apology. But you know, 
every day we can start out with a clean slate. I hope we can do 
it. As far as I am concerned, I would like to try. 
But whether I resign, or whether you kick me out as a Director, 
I still want to be your friend. Why don't you give me a chance? 
With best wishes, 
Tab I 
I, Clarence I. Jus the in, being of sound and tEsntfsing mixta ana 
memory end free frcr.; all nenece, fraud, duress, undue influence 
or restraint vhctsoever, do hereby no*.:e this codicil to my Last 
V7ill and Testament Milch ics signed by r.e, June 22, 1972 • 
Prior rVln-cno1: on I hereby revoke ell prior bequests and. 
testamentary dispositions node by ne concerning my interest and 
stock holdings in the Wyoning Petroleum Corp., of i/hich I ov/n 
rpprcxinatoly Fifty percent (JO;*)* 
I hereby jive, bequeath, and devise to Raynond A. IZhcrt, to be 
his absolutely, -.rithcut accountability in the distribution 
provided for ir. the residunry of r.y CP:O vrill, nil of ny 
interert and stcc:: holdings in the Vyor.ir.- Petroleum Corp«, if he 
is living, otherwise to his children, if any are living, children 
c-'T deecass-d children to ta!:c ay right of representation^ 
I.h-ve hereunto set ny hand, this 2?th d?,y of i^y, 19ol* 
Grentor 
Clarence I. Jui^iibcin 
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